

Refugee Return and Conflict: Evidence from a Natural Experiment*

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Abstract

We estimate the causal effect of a large-scale cash assistance program for refugee returnees on conflict in Afghanistan. The program led to a significant increase in repatriation. Leveraging historical returnee settlement patterns and previously unreleased combat records, we find that policy-induced refugee return had cross-cutting effects, reducing insurgent violence, but increasing social conflict. The program's cash benefits were substantial and may have raised reservation wages in communities where returnees repatriated. Consistent with this hypothesis, policy-induced return had heterogeneous effects on insurgent violence, decreasing use of labor-intensive combat, increasing the lethality of capital-intensive insurgent attacks, and reducing the effectiveness of counterinsurgent bomb neutralization missions. Additionally, social capital and local institutions for dispute resolution significantly offset the risks of refugee return for communal violence. Our study provides the first causal evidence demonstrating the link between aid-induced refugee return and political and social conflict. These results are economically significant, highlighting unintended consequences of repatriation aid and clarifying the conditions under which refugee return affects conflict. Supporting social capital and legitimate, local institutions are key antecedents for safe refugee repatriation.

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1 Introduction

The number of forcibly displaced people (FDP) has grown precipitously in the past two decades. As of 2020, more than 38 million people are displaced across borders, with most fleeing war or chronic insecurity in their origin countries. Increasing conflict duration has exacerbated this trend, causing the protraction of many displacement situations. As a result, FDP are acutely vulnerable, facing tenuous legal status, political exclusion, poverty, poor access to services, and outright hostility. This situation is compounded by the fact that many FDP come from marginalized backgrounds, and are targeted specifically because of their racial, ethnic, religious, gender, sexual, political, or other identities.

Making progress on conflict resolution, development, and minority empowerment requires programmatic solutions to refugee crises. But despite the magnitude of this challenge, few policy responses exist. Fewer than 2% of all FDP have accessed any of the three “durable solutions”—resettlement in the Global North, naturalization in host countries, or repatriation to origin countries—in recent years. Resettlement is hampered by discriminatory backlash against refugees (Dancygier, 2010). Since 2000, the number of resettled FDP has never exceeded 0.61% of the global displaced stock. Similarly, naturalization in host states is complicated by the fact that 85% of FDP reside in developing countries with weak institutional capacity (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019).¹ While a growing number of Global South hosts encourage refugee self-reliance through integrative policies, citizenship remains politically contentious (Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022b). Finally, though refugee return is widely regarded as the preferred solution (Harrell-Bond, 1989), protracted conflicts in origin countries often render repatriation infeasible (Long, 2013). Although some individuals may still opt to return home while war is ongoing (Ghosn et al., 2021), perceived insecurity is the main deterrent to voluntary repatriation (Blitz, Sales and Marzano, 2005; Alrababa’h et al., 2022). When refugees return home during conflict, they face greater risks of poverty (Fransen, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017), criminality (Petrin, 2002), rebel recruitment (Harpviken and Lischer, 2013), and social conflict (Schwartz, 2019).

A number of recent policies have aimed at facilitating repatriation by providing returnees with cash transfers to ease reintegration (Gerver, 2018a). Prominent ethical and impact evaluation questions remain about these programs. For one, coercing return through cash-inducements undermines the voluntariness of repatriation incumbent in the international

¹In spite of weaker capacity, these hosts are active and strategic displacement policymakers (Abdelaaty, 2021; Norman, 2020; Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022a).

legal regime around non-refoulement. Qualitative work has also conceptualized the potential unintended welfare consequences of incentivized return (Gerver, 2018b). Despite the increasing prominence of cash-for-return programs and the need for rigorous program evaluation of repatriation policies more generally, there is little quantitative evidence evaluating the link between refugee return and violence.

Disentangling the effects of (program-induced) refugee return on conflict is a thorny empirical challenge, and must confront two inferential hurdles. First, existing data on refugee repatriation varies starkly in quality across countries over time. During complex crises, field staff face logistical challenges in tracking migrants across peripheral regions (Zakirova and Buzurukov, 2021, 6). Complicating measurement, FDP may conceal their identities due to safety concerns stemming from the nature of the threats they face. Second, when and where returnees flee is directly linked to security conditions in prospective destination communities (Ghosn et al., 2021). Because returnees often eschew return as a result of ongoing (Alrababa’h et al., 2022) or past violence (Camarena and Hägerdal, 2020), few quantitative studies have been able to credibly estimate the effects of repatriation on subsequent conflict.

This article advances our understanding of refugee return by leveraging granular micro-data on repatriation and violence, in tandem with a large cash grant scheme implemented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2016. The cash program was aimed at Afghan returnees from Pakistan, and saw a temporary doubling of cash assistance offered to voluntary repatriates. Using a novel combination of observational and survey-based measures, we demonstrate that the policy led to a significant increase in refugee return. The scale of repatriation following the intervention was unparalleled: program recipients represented more than 363,000 refugees or 66% of *global* documented returnees in 2016.² We identify the causal effect of encashed returns by exploiting the program’s quasi-random timing and historical returnee settlement patterns in a difference-in-differences framework.

The timing of the cash transfer—during the annual fighting season—offers a unique opportunity to explore how refugee return affected violence. Every summer, the Taliban recruits a large force of temporary soldiers. These part-time fighters are chiefly income-motivated, and support professional cadres in major offensives (Landinfo, 2017). Impoverished Afghan returnees from Pakistan are a historical source of these recruits (Harpviken and Lischer, 2013; Lakhani and Amiri, 2020). Mass repatriation during the fighting season creates ripe conditions for finding a positive effect of repatriation on rebel violence. However, since each

²At the rate the U.S. resettled refugees in 2020, it would take 31 years to resettle the number of refugees that returned in six months under the program.

member of a returning household received the grant, the return of each family represented a meaningful stimulus to the local economy in destination communities. In line with recent evidence on the positive impacts of refugee aid (Lehmann and Masterson, 2020; Masterson and Lehmann, 2020) and policies that foster refugee integration (Couttenier et al., 2019), we find that encashed returns reduced militancy overall.

We probe several mechanisms underpinning this result. First, inter-household, intra-communal economic spillovers from returnees to hosts in impacted areas may have raised reservation wages, increasing the premium on part-time rebel mobilization. Consistent with this mechanism, we find that insurgents substituted from labor-intensive combat into capital-intensive attacks (which require fewer recruits) during the program. This composition shift in violence was also associated with improving insurgent lethality, implying a stark, negative welfare consequence. In addition, the community-level economic boon from encashed returns may have constrained counterinsurgent tip-buying by raising the price of information. We provide suggestive evidence of this dynamic. Program exposure reduced the rate of counterinsurgent bomb neutralizations, which are highly sensitive to civilian tipping (Sonin and Wright, 2022).

We also use the policy intervention to study consequences of refugee return for social conflict. Existing work highlights property disputes as a crucial source of tension between returnees and hosts (Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016; Schwartz, 2019; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2021). In Afghanistan, repatriation has sparked land clashes and honor feuds (Murtazashvili, 2016). Violence has important welfare implications, increasing risk-taking and discounting (Voors et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2014). Using unique survey data on relations between returnees and their non-migrant neighbors, we find that, in contrast to insurgent violence, communal violence increased in communities exposed to policy-induced return. We also explore how social capital and informal dispute resolution mechanisms help offset risks of social conflict. We develop novel measures of proximity to kin and the accessibility of local shuras. Social networks and strong, local institutions dampen communal conflict following repatriation.

Our study makes several important contributions. We provide evidence of the risks associated with return induced by a large-scale economic intervention. Prior work has focused primarily on how refugee flows (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006), and especially camps (Lischer, 2006; Zhou and Andrew C., 2021), affect violence, and how integrative policies can offset (Kreibaum, 2016; Couttenier et al., 2019) or enflame (Jacobsen, 2005) these risks. In each case, there remains mixed evidence on the potential welfare implications of displacement. We

provide evidence documenting the risks of return, as well as factors that may help mitigate conflicts triggered by repatriation. Our study extends scholarship on the implications of refugee return for conflict (e.g., [van Houte, 2017](#); [Schwartz, 2019](#)), and clarifies broader policy debates over how FDP affect violence and development.

By leveraging a quasi-experimental design, we offer the first causal evidence on how programs designed to facilitate refugee return affect conflict. In spite of its policy significance, repatriation is difficult to assess empirically because returnees’ decisions are endogenous to violence ([Alrababa’h et al., 2022](#)). Motivated by [Rozo and Vargas \(2021\)](#), our design leverages an unexpected shock to repatriation assistance aid provided by UNHCR. Credibly identifying the downstream consequences of repatriation is crucial given the prevailing view that return is the best available solution to forced displacement ([Bradley, 2013](#)). In this regard, our empirical findings complement qualitative work on repatriation and conflict ([Schwartz, 2019](#); [Lakhani and Amiri, 2020](#)).

We offer an important conceptual contribution by distinguishing different types of conflict—namely insurgent and communal violence. Although canonical work recognizes a diversity of events that occur within substate conflicts ([Wood, 2003](#); [Kalyvas, 2006](#); [Berman et al., 2017](#); [Bazzi et al., 2022](#); [Limodio, 2022](#)), ranging from anti-government attacks and state repression to warlordism and social conflict, these outcomes tend to be studied in isolation. The prevailing focus on individual forms of violence limits our ability to craft generalized theories of conflict. By distinguishing varieties of violence, we also gain a window into civilian agency and the role of noncombatants as victims and potential perpetrators of harm. Our theoretical framework and results bridge this gap by explicitly considering how varieties of violence relate to mass repatriation. We document divergent effects of refugee return on insurgent versus communal clashes, highlighting the unique and nuanced ways displacement shocks, resources, and local institutions interact to shape wartime violence in its various forms.

Further, our study provides an important quantitative microfoundation for evaluating repatriation policies, marking a substantial contribution to the economics of displacement ([Boustan, Fishback and Kantor, 2010](#); [Bazzi et al., 2016, 2019](#); [Becker and andreas, 2019](#); [Couttenier et al., 2019](#); [Becker et al., 2020](#); [Testa, 2021](#)). Crafting economic interventions that improve livelihoods and mitigate the risks associated with displacement during and after conflict is an important priority for the international community. Understanding how incentive-based policies induce repatriation, and what can be done to thwart challenges returnees face, is central to this goal. This paper deepens our understanding of these policy

dynamics in a highly relevant context, and provides actionable insights about how to improve future efforts to help displaced people return home.

2 How Forced Displacement Affects Conflict

In fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings, the potential impacts of mass displacement on security are significant and diverse. Prior work highlights three major ways FDP may affect conflict: (1) by exacerbating militancy, (2) by exacerbating social strife, and (3) by dampening violence.³ Our empirical tests adjudicate these channels in the context of a cash program for returnees.

2.1 Displacement and Militancy

The effect of civil conflict in spurring large-scale forced displacement is well-known. But displacement may also serve as a cause of conflict. For one, refugee flows can spur conflict spillovers from origin countries into neighboring regions where refugees flee. [Salehyan and Gleditsch \(2006\)](#) show that displacement can broaden rebel networks, and contribute to the cross-border diffusion of arms, ideologies, and combatants. Refugee encampments may serve as particularly dangerous conduits for insurgent recruitment and training ([Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989](#); [Lischer, 2006](#)). For instance, the Afghan Taliban grew from a network of settlements and madrassas for Afghan refugees in Pakistan ([Harpviken and Lischer, 2013](#)). Militants embedded among displaced populations can also manipulate humanitarian aid ([Lischer, 2006](#)), instrumentalize ethnicity ([Whitaker, 2003](#)), and conscript vulnerable youths into rebel organizations ([Haer and Hecker, 2018](#)). Consequently, refugee flows are associated with increased terrorism ([Milton, Spencer and Findley, 2013](#)), though much of this effect is because displaced people are targets, rather than perpetrators, of violence ([Onoma, 2013](#); [Fisk, 2018](#)).

Many of the same dynamics are magnified in the case of refugee repatriation. Where militants have infiltrated refugee populations abroad, mass return can give fighters cover to re-enter origin countries for attacks ([Harpviken and Lischer, 2013](#)). When refugees return to contested or insurgent-held communities, governments may engage in preemptive repression ([Stein and Cuny, 1994](#)), sparking further conflict and repeated flight ([van Houte,](#)

³[Lehmann \(2020\)](#) provides an excellent overview of this literature, and theoretical perspectives on how displacement, aid, and violence intersect.

2017). Conditions in origin countries can also drive returnees to support militants. Poor and low-skilled repatriates are often forced into itinerant or illicit jobs (Petrin, 2002; Fransen, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2017), making them ripe targets for rebel recruitment (Haer and Hecker, 2018). Price shocks resulting from mass repatriation also reduce the opportunity costs of rebellion (Camarena, 2016a). Further, repatriation can strain fragile institutions in origin countries (Camarena, 2016b), increasing dissatisfaction with the state (Schultz, 2011; Lakhani and Amiri, 2020). Even where returnees support government forces, violence may increase as insurgents launch retributive attacks to deter collaboration (Seefar, 2019). Humanitarian aid to refugees may also reduce the number of potential fighters, as Masterson and Lehmann (2020) find in Syria, highlighting the importance of economic assistance during return.

2.2 Displacement and Social Conflict

In addition to militancy, refugee return may affect social conflict. As Schwartz (2019, 110) notes, “conflict between returning and non-migrant populations after civil war is a nearly ubiquitous issue for societies recovering from such wars.” Return-induced competition over jobs (Petrin, 2002), housing (Harild, Christensen and Zetter, 2015), and land (Schwartz, 2019) may spur criminality and communal strife. In countries like Afghanistan, where livelihoods are tied to agriculture, property disputes are a particularly common source of grievance. In these settings, violent land clashes have erupted between returnees and host community members (Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016; Kamminga and Zaki, 2018; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2021). These clashes have significant welfare implications. Economically, they may destroy the productivity of land by increasing contamination with mines or damaging irrigation infrastructure (Seefar, 2019). Socially, land conflicts are likely to metastasize into broader tribal disputes or honor feuds, which can spur retributory killings (Murtazashvili, 2016). Property disputes can also exacerbate insurgent violence (Albertus, 2020), especially where returnees or hosts ally with militants to combat alleged usurpers (Lakhani and Amiri, 2020).

If local elites politicize identity (Whitaker, 2003) or make threats to dissuade demographic change (Camarena and Hägerdal, 2020) in response to returnee inflows, repatriation can spur ethnic conflict. Migration status (i.e., returnee or stayee) may itself take on identity salience if policies attach privileges to those collective categories. For instance, when government regulations were perceived as benefiting returnees in Burundi, violent cleavages erupted between returnee and non-migrant community members (Schwartz, 2019). This dynamic is

especially likely to unfold over humanitarian assistance. Marginalized hosts frequently clash with refugees and returnees who they believe hold disproportionate access to aid (Jacobsen, 2005).

2.3 Displacement and Stability

A third approach emphasizes the contributions of displaced people to security and stability. Above all, this perspective views returnees as a source of human capital, and hence an engine for peacebuilding and development (Loescher, 1996). Past experiences of violence foster emotional attachments to home (Blitz, Sales and Marzano, 2005), as well as self-efficacy and expertise in risk assessment (Ghosn et al., 2021). These factors make returnees a crucial asset for post-conflict reconciliation. Returnees' familiarity with hardships of war may also lead them to oppose future violence (Lakhani and Amiri, 2020).


Developmental contributions of returnees can also foster stability. Zhou and Andrew C. (2021) show that large, concentrated populations of FDP reduce local conflict by improving economic conditions. Humanitarian assistance targeting FDP may raise living standards for whole communities (Kreibaum, 2016). Aid spillovers from displaced beneficiaries to non-migrant neighbors also improve community relations, increase market exchange, and foster positive social contact (Lehmann and Masterson, 2020). In Afghanistan, some non-returnee urban poor have benefited from infrastructural investments targeting repatriates (Harild, Christensen and Zetter, 2015). Additionally, returnees may bolster production in destination communities by bringing back skills acquired while displaced (Bahar et al., 2018). Under these conditions, refugee return can reduce conflict.

3 Context

In 1979, the Soviet invasion triggered four decades of civil war in Afghanistan. Since then, Afghanistan has been the single largest source of forced migrants worldwide, with 20-30% of all citizens displaced abroad at some point (Schultz, 2011). Pakistan has served as the primary host country for Afghan refugees. The (almost entirely Afghan) refugee population in Pakistan has ranked in the top-five largest worldwide each of the past 42 years, and the largest globally in 22 of the past 42 years. In 2016, almost 2.9 million Afghans were refugees, and of these, Pakistan hosted 54%—about 1.5 million people.

Forced displacement from Afghanistan to Pakistan is characterized by waves. Intense conflict episodes spur mass flight into Pakistan, and periodic moments of stability precipitate

Figure 1: Afghan Refugee Flight to and Return from Pakistan



Note: Panel A depicts stocks of Afghan refugees in Pakistan over time. Panel B depicts documented Afghan refugee returns from Pakistan over time. Data come from the UNHCR PopStats database.

returns to Afghanistan. Absent sustained peace, all repatriation to Afghanistan has taken place in a wartime setting, frequently triggering repeated displacement (van Houte, 2017). Figure 1 highlights this dynamic.⁴ Spikes in displacement coincide with the Soviet invasion in 1979, the US invasion in 2001, and the Taliban resurgence in 2006. Spikes in repatriation follow the collapse of the Soviet-backed communist government in 1992 and the Taliban collapse in 2001. These patterns also underscore the difficulty of identifying how refugee return affects conflict—trends in violence and displacement directly co-vary.

To study the causal effect of refugee repatriation on conflict, we leverage a sudden, exogenous increase in assisted returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2016—the third spike in the panel (b) of Figure 1. We focus on returns triggered by a large-scale repatriation cash assistance program implemented by UNHCR. Although similar programs have been piloted in several other countries (Gerver, 2018a), the Afghan program remains the largest ever attempted.

On June 23, 2016, during a visit to Pakistan, UNHCR Commissioner Filippo Grandi announced assistance offered to voluntary Afghan returnees from Pakistan would be expanded. Following this announcement, on June 29, UNHCR officials began paying out increased repatriation grants. The only eligibility requirement for accessing cash was registering with UNHCR prior to return.⁵ Figure A-2 provides additional details about the encashment

⁴Similar dynamics characterize forced displacement (Holland and Peters, 2020) and return (Figure A-1) in numerous other settings.

⁵Refugees who first registered with UNHCR are called “documented” or “assisted.” Refugees who returned

process. To publicize the program, the Afghan government launched a concurrent media campaign known as “Khpal Watan, Gul Watan.”⁶ The encashment program ran from June 29 to December 7, 2016, when UNHCR announced a winter pause in assisted returns. Although officials planned to continue the program in 2017, budgetary shortfalls prevented an extension. When documented returns from Pakistan resumed on April 3, 2017, assistance reverted to pre-program levels.

Table 1: Returnee Cash Assistance Was Economically Meaningful

	Annual Afghan GDP/Capita (\$509)	Monthly Part-Time Fighter Wage (\$300)	Monthly Returnee Wage-Low (\$73)	Monthly Returnee Wage-High (\$146)	Monthly National Wage (\$160)
Returnee Cash Assistance (\$400)	79%	133%	548%	274%	250%

Note: All cells depict returnee cash assistance as a percentage of the top row indicator. 2016 Afghan GDP/capita comes from the World Bank. Landinfo (2017) report mean monthly wages of part-time Taliban cadres during the fighting season. Haroon et al. (2019) report mean monthly wages of the “bread-winner” in each family of Afghan returnees from Pakistan, with low and high estimates. Mean monthly wages nationwide come from a representative survey fielded by the Asia Foundation. Amounts in US dollars are converted from Afghanis by June 29, 2016 exchange rates.

The UNHCR’s repatriation cash assistance was economically meaningful. The average amount paid to *each* Afghan returnee from Pakistan increased from \$200 to \$400. For the median returnee family, this amounted to an average payment of \$3600.⁷ Table 1 benchmarks assistance against pertinent economic indicators. Assisted returnees received the cash equivalent of 79% of national GDP per capita, 1.3 months of wages as a temporary Taliban fighter, and at least 2.5 months of licit wages. These estimates represent a lower-bound because most returnees were women and children, groups with low labor force participation.⁸ With three (rebel) recruitment-age males in the median returnee group, cumulative cash assistance was equivalent to an entire fighting season of potential familial income from temporary Taliban mobilization.⁹

without UNHCR facilitation are considered “undocumented” or “spontaneous.” These latter returnees were not granted cash assistance, though a small number received supplemental assistance (\$20-50) from the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) at border crossings.


⁶This translates to “My country, my beautiful country.” The program included advertisements in refugee-populated areas of Pakistan.

⁷The median size of each returnee group in 2016 was 9. Observed sizes ranged from 1 to 643. Most returnee groups consisted of immediate family members, but occasionally extended families or entire communities relocated.

⁸70% of returnees were women (any age) or male children (under 18). Just 13% of returnee women were employed upon return (Haroon et al., 2019).

⁹The annual fighting season lasts from June to September. During this time, Taliban ranks swell with a cadre of part-time fighters. Recruitment-age males are 12-64 years old.

Figure 2: The Encashment Program Triggered Mass Refugee Return



Note: The solid line shows assisted (documented) refugee returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The dashed line shows spontaneous (undocumented) refugee returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Gray bars denote the period of the repatriation cash program.

Figure 2 shows that refugee returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan increased sharply in response to the encashment program.¹⁰ In the first half of 2016, Afghanistan received 40,769 returnees from Pakistan—6,875 assisted and 33,894 spontaneous returnees. In the second half of 2016, under encashment, 577,387 Afghans repatriated from Pakistan, including 363,227 assisted and 214,160 spontaneous returnees. Although spontaneous returns historically exceeded assisted returns, this trend reversed under the program, suggesting a deliberate effort of returnees to repatriate through formal channels in order to take advantage of cash assistance.¹¹ As a result of the grant, returns to Afghanistan in 2016 reached pre-2006 levels,

¹⁰Data from a survey of Afghan returnees reveals that encashment-eligible respondents are significantly more likely to report financing their return through UNHCR aid (Table A-1). This result helps corroborate a link between cash assistance and return. See also Figure A-4 and Section A.4.

¹¹Most returns are spontaneous and undocumented because the process of documented return is slower and requires UNHCR facilitation (Harild, Christensen and Zetter, 2015). Some spontaneous returns occur because of adverse conditions (e.g., job loss, harassment) in host countries like Pakistan (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Prospective returnees from Pakistan reside in an information-poor environment, and many spontaneous returnees during the initial months of the encashment program were simply unaware that assistance was only available to returnees who were registered with UNHCR (Kamminga and Zaki, 2018). IOM officials deployed at Transit Centres near border crossings monitor spontaneous flows, and we use their reports to reconstruct country-wide, monthly flows of undocumented returnees into Afghanistan.

when US reconstruction prompted the last large wave of returnees.

What precipitated the sudden increase in repatriation cash assistance? The decision resulted from more than a year of negotiations between UNHCR and the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in consultation with a shura of Afghan refugees. As described below and in greater detail in Section A.3, the proximate cause of the increase was Pakistan’s insistence on reducing its hosting burden. Ultimately, this pressure grew out of a key strategic issue in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: the 2014 Peshawar school attack.

On December 16, 2014, six Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants killed 149 people in an attack on a school in Peshawar, Pakistan.¹² Though no Afghan refugees were involved in the violence, the attack spurred a wave of anti-Afghan xenophobia.¹³ In response, Afghan refugees in Pakistan reported retributive evictions, job loss, and extensive police harassment (Bjelica, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017). The Pakistani government exerted additional pressure in 2015 when it changed its policy on refugees’ Proof-of-Registration (PoR) cards, which governed access to key services (e.g., work permits) and goods (e.g., SIM cards). PoR cards expired on December 31, 2015, and Pakistani officials delayed granting an extension until January 12, 2016, creating status insecurity for refugees. Whereas previous extensions applied for at least one year, the January 2016 extension expired on June 30, 2016. In June 2016, Pakistan leveraged the threat of expiration to compel the UNHCR to facilitate refugee returns via the cash program.¹⁴

Pakistani coercion, which had prevailed throughout 2015 and early 2016, continued in mid-2016, after the program had begun (Figure A-3).¹⁵ At that time, Pakistani police and landlords pursued anti-refugee harassment like bribe-taking, rent hikes, and arbitrary increases in fees for access to documents and services (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 18-27). This abuse was economic in nature, and likely motivated by the encashment program, designed to capitalize on the unexpected windfall in returnee support.

¹²TTP is known as the Pakistani Taliban. Their relationship with the Afghan Taliban is fraught, and the latter often condemn TTP violence against Pakistani targets. We refer to the Pakistani Taliban as TTP and the Afghan Taliban as the Taliban.

¹³The Pakistani government fueled rumours of Afghan refugee involvement, claiming the attack was planned in Afghanistan, and identifying two of the six perpetrators as (non-refugee) Afghans.

¹⁴In June, PoR expiration was extended until December 31, 2016 because the UNHCR agreed to encashment. Extensions have subsequently been granted in three or six month increments. Pakistani manipulation of card expiration was raised privately in negotiations with UNHCR.

¹⁵Figure A-3 plots the number of Afghans deported by Pakistan each month, a proxy for broader anti-Afghan coercion (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Seefar, 2019). The level of deportations was lower during the encashment program than in the 18 months preceding the program.

Concurrent coercion in Pakistan raises natural concerns about identification. To this end, we provide multiple pieces of evidence. First, we formalize our design with a directed graph, which clarifies key parameters of interest (Figure A-4). Second, in Table A-3 we present survey evidence on returnees’ self-reported reasons for return. We find no evidence that program beneficiaries were more likely to report repatriating because of repressive conditions in Pakistan. We do find, however, that program beneficiaries were more likely to report encashment through UNHCR as the primary aid enabling repatriation during the period of study (Tables A-1 and A-2).¹⁶ Third, in Section A.4 we highlight qualitative evidence from interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch (2017), which underscores the importance of cash assistance in enabling repatriation. Fourth, we show that our focal effects are unique to encashed returns. In contrast, undocumented returnees—who did not receive cash assistance—had no distinguishable effects on conflict (Tables A-13 – A-14). By demonstrating that non-beneficiary returnees who repatriated during the program period—and hence were also exposed to Pakistani coercion—did not impact the conflict, we offer credible evidence that cash assistance is the core mechanism.

4 Research Design

In this section we describe our microdata and estimation strategy. Summary statistics for all variables are described in Tables A-6 and A-7. Variable definitions and sources are discussed in appendix B.


4.1 Combat Records

Our investigation exploits newly-released, sensitive but unclassified military records from the International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE), which catalogue insurgent and counterinsurgent combat engagements in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2017. The INDURE platform was populated using detailed significant activity (SIGACT) reports logged by Afghan security forces and NATO troops, and offers extremely high resolution. Data are time-stamped down to the minute, geo-referenced down to the meter, and include additional details about the event type, units involved, and casualties. These data are most directly comparable to data described in [Andrew C. and Wright \(2017\)](#). However, whereas

¹⁶The survey did not ask directly about encashment as an inducement to return, but we do find that program beneficiaries were distinguishably more likely to report repatriating because of improved economic conditions in Afghanistan (Table A-4), a fact likely attributable to encashment.

extant combat records from Afghanistan cover the period from 2006–2014, our records cover the period from 2015–2017. The records we draw on offer a substantial improvement in coverage and precision over media-based collection efforts. As [Weidmann \(2016, 211\)](#) notes, our tactical reports represent the near “universe” of insurgent-related violence.

Figure 3: Insurgent Violence During the Encashment Program



Note: Panels shade districts by the intensive margin of insurgent violence.

To understand how refugee return shapes conflict, we focus on insurgent-initiated attacks against Afghan security forces or their NATO partners. The detailed nature of our conflict microdata allows us to track several types of insurgent activity, including direct fire, indirect fire, and explosive hazards. Direct fire attacks are line-of-sight, close combat operations, like frontal assaults on convoys or patrolling troops. Indirect fires consist of rocket and mortar attacks perpetrated at long-range. Explosive hazards include improvised explosive devices

(IEDs) and landmines.¹⁷ We depict the spatial distribution of these attacks in Figure 3.

4.2 Survey of Returnees

Our military records offer a comprehensive portrait of combat between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. However, these data do not track social conflicts occurring between civilians, tribes, or other groups. We draw on rich survey data to understand communal violence and returnee relations with their non-migrant (i.e., “stayee”) neighbors. Specifically, we leverage individual-level data from the Survey of Afghan Returnees fielded in two waves in 2018-2019 by the Asia Foundation. The survey was contracted by USAID and implemented by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), a subsidiary of the international firm D3. Sayara Research provided third-party field verification. ACSOR hired and trained local enumerators in household and respondent selection, including lessons on how to correctly record answers to questions, culturally-sensitive interview methods, and secure storage of contact information.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted by gender-matched enumerators in 65 districts in Kandahar, Nangarhar, Kabul, Balkh, and Herat Provinces. Returnees residing in settlements were randomly sampled from a sampling frame based on the IOM Baseline Mobility Assessment. The sample is population-proportional-to-size within each province, and can be taken as representative of returnees in the five sampled provinces. A random walk was used to select households within sampled settlements, and a Kish grid was used to select respondents from within sampled households. We use information on respondents’ country of asylum, date of repatriation, and registration status to triangulate likely program beneficiaries. The contact rate was 84.60%, the cooperation rate was 89.12%, the response rate was 74.57%, and the refusal rate was 7.10%.

To measure community relations between returnees and their non-migrant neighbors we construct a multi-item index using inverse covariance-weighting (Anderson, 2008).¹⁸ This index combines responses to six questions about returnees’ local relations, including: experiences of (1) disputes and (2) discrimination; whether neighbors (3) invite returnees to community events; and perceptions that neighbors are (4) helpful, (5) respectful, and (6) friendly. Together these items capture various dimensions of returnees’ community ties, ranging from overt experiences of local violence to subjective feelings of social exclusion.

¹⁷We focus on detonated rather than emplaced hazards because IEDs/mines can only achieve intended effects when they are successfully exploded. Results are substantively similar when we study emplaced hazards.

¹⁸Results are substantively similar using principal component analysis.

Figure A-5 plots mean returnee-stayee relations across districts. In supplemental analyses we also develop a measure of communal violence based on conflict event data (Section A.5). The core results are robust.

We also consider how social capital and other neighborhood-level social dynamics moderate the relationship between program-induced return and communal conflict. We measure social capital using an index capturing whether returnees reside in proximity to their familial kin or other repatriates. Scholarship on returnee reintegration underscores the important role kinship and migrant social networks play in easing communal tensions (Schwartz, 2019).

Finally, we use a range of additional survey measures to bolster our empirical strategy. For instance, we document that program beneficiaries are more likely to report financing return through UNHCR aid (Table A-1) but not other forms of assistance (Table A-2). We also show that encashed returnees are not distinguishably more likely to report having returned because of adverse conditions in Pakistan (Table A-3). Indeed, of all reasons for return, program beneficiaries are only distinguishably more likely to report returning because they perceived improving economic conditions in Afghanistan (Table A-4), an effect likely attributable to encashment. In Table A-5 we present difference-in-means comparing respondents who received the cash transfer we study versus program non-beneficiaries. There are few significant differences.¹⁹


4.3 Refugee Returns

We supplement our conflict measures with granular data on documented refugee returns provided by the UNHCR-Afghanistan office. For each group of returnees repatriating with UNHCR facilitation, we observe the date of return, country of asylum (Pakistan, Iran, or elsewhere), group size and gender composition, and geographic details, including province and district of origin, as well as intended province and district of return. This data was gathered by UNHCR staff during interviews with assisted returnees at Encashment Centres in Afghanistan, where repatriation cash was distributed. Comprehensive data on documented returns are available for 2013-2014 and 2016-2019. We focus on returns around the cash program (2016), but leverage geographic settlement patterns of 2013 returnees to predict the destinations of these later returnees, as described in greater detail below. Although granular data on returnees are not available for 2015, we use UNHCR reports to reconstruct

¹⁹For instance, recipients of the encashment program are more likely to be Pashtun and less likely to be Tajik, Uzbek, or Hazara. These differences are intuitive because the program only applied to Afghan refugee returnees from Pakistan, and Pashtuns dominate the districts near the Afghan-Pakistan border.

the country-wide, monthly flow of returnees from each asylum country in 2015.²⁰ Figure 4 depicts observed returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan during the encashment program.

Figure 4: Documented Refugee Returns from Pakistan During the Encashment Program



Note: Darker shades indicate more documented returnees during the 2016 program.

4.4 Empirical Strategy


To identify the causal effect of refugee return on conflict, we combine historical resettlement patterns and the unexpected timing of the repatriation assistance program. This approach resembles the identification used in [Camarena and Hägerdal \(2020\)](#) and [Rozo and Vargas \(2021\)](#), who also leverage temporal shocks to estimate the effects of migration. Our measure of exposure to repatriation during the encashment program is analogous to a Bartik or shift-share instrument, where cross-sectional variation is interacted with an otherwise exogenous time-series shift ([Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2020](#)).

To measure historical resettlement patterns, we rely on the earliest available district-level returnee data provided by UNHCR—in 2013. Formally, we measure: $\frac{\text{District Returns}_{2013}}{\text{Total Returns}_{2013}}$. We depict 2013 shares in the left panel of Figure 5. Multiplying 2013 shares by the total, national-level inflow of documented returnees gives a measure of predicted repatriation at the district-month. As reflected in the right panel of Figure 5, predicted and observed returns are highly correlated (Pearson’s $\rho = 0.870$), suggesting 2013 returnee settlement patterns are


²⁰The absence of disaggregated data on 2015 returns is due to clerical error. Links to the 2015 data shared by UNHCR redirect to the 2019 returnee file.

Figure 5: Predicting Repatriation Using Past Returnee Settlement Patterns

(a) District Share of 2013 Pakistan Returnees



(b) Observed Versus Predicted Returns



Note: Panel (a) depicts each district's share of 2013 Afghan returnees from Pakistan. Darker shades indicate a greater share. Panel (b) depicts the correlation between predicted and observed returns from Pakistan at the district-month.

strongly correlated with 2016 returnee destinations.²¹ In our main specification, we estimate the reduced form effects of refugee exposure on conflict. This approach is equivalent to an intent-to-treat design, mitigating concerns that actual returnee settlement patterns are endogenous to security conditions (Zakirova and Buzurukov, 2021; Alrababa'h et al., 2022).

We start from a generalized difference-in-differences framework. As noted above, district-level shares of 2013 returnee inflows from Pakistan define cross-sectional exposure to 2016 returns. Temporally, the UNHCR encashment program provides a time-series shock to repatriation from Pakistan. We identify the causal effect of refugee return on conflict by combining these features in the following reduced-form, least squares equation:²²

$$Y_{d,t} = \delta(2013 \text{ Returnee Share}_d \times \text{Cash Program}_t) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \gamma_{u \times t} + \mu(X_d \times \beta_t) + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where d indexes districts, t indexes year-specific months, and u indexes UNHCR areas of

²¹Figure A-6 plots observed versus predicted returns to Afghanistan in 2016. This correlation is stronger than Roza and Vargas (2021)'s benchmark correlation (Pearson's $\rho = 0.741$) between observed and predicted Venezuelan migration to Colombia.

²²Naive and instrumental variables estimates are substantively similar (Table 4). To mitigate additional concerns that past settlement patterns are themselves endogenous, we explore additional sources of cross-sectional variation in returnee exposure in Table A-12.

operation.²³ $Y_{d,t}$ are conflict-related dependent variables. 2013 Returnee Share $_d$ is the share of Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan to district d in 2013, relative to all returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013.²⁴ Cash Program $_t$ is an indicator for months during the encashment program (July-December 2016). δ is the coefficient of interest, and captures whether the cash assistance program induced a differential shift in violence in districts more heavily exposed to encashed returns. For consistency across conflict measures, we focus on variation in 2016. α_d , β_t , and $\gamma_{u \times t}$ are district, year-specific month, and UNHCR area by year-specific month fixed effects respectively. Together, these absorb time-invariant differences across districts, common time shocks affecting all districts, and time-varying shocks common to all districts within a UNHCR area. X_d is a vector of pre-shock, district-level controls, which we interact with year-specific month fixed effects. These controls account flexibly for pre-treatment heterogeneity in observables across districts. ϵ are robust, district-clustered standard errors. All estimates are scaled using district population weights.²⁵

The key identifying assumption in our models is that in the absence of the 2016 encashment program, districts hosting larger shares of returnees would experience common trends in violence. Differential trends could be driven by a number of factors, including anticipation of the policy. We expect anticipation is unlikely since the announcement of the grant increase in June 2016 was sudden and unexpected, triggering a sharp, discontinuous increase in repatriation. Nonetheless, we follow the suggestion of Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2020), and provide graphical evidence of parallel pre-trends in Figure 6. We illustrate these pre-intervention trends using the event study method introduced in Sun and Abraham (2021, 180-181), excluding two pre-policy periods. This design helps account for secular and potentially non-linear pre-trends (Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess, 2022). Violence is consistently parallel in the pre-treatment period before becoming distinguishably negative during the encashment period.²⁶ These results build confidence in our strategy.


²³UNHCR divides Afghanistan into eight areas of operation (Figure A-2).

²⁴We z -standardize 2013 shares for interpretability.

²⁵Two reasons motivate our decision to incorporate population weights. First, these address heterogeneous effects of treatment with respect to population. It is a stylized fact that refugee returnees flock to urban areas of their origin countries, which Petrin (2002) calls “urban bias.” In Afghanistan, more than 25% of encashed returnees repatriated to Kabul (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 68). Population weighting captures this pattern. Second, population weights account for heteroskedasticity with respect to population (Solon, Haider and Wooldridge, 2015), improving precision of our estimates relative to unweighted results (Table A-19).

²⁶Panel (b) of Figure 6 indicates that per capita insurgent violence is potentially trending downward in period $t-2$, but extending the time series reveals that the trend reverts to earlier levels at time t .

Figure 6: Assessing Pre-Trends



Notes: Bars are 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Plots depict pre-policy trends in insurgent violence. White circles are estimates from a baseline model with district and year-specific month fixed effects. Black circles are estimates from a saturated model with parameters described in columns 5 and 9 of Table 2. Two pre-policy periods (January and June 2016), denoted by vertical gray dashed lines, are omitted. The x-axis indicates time to July 2016, when the program began. The horizontal red line denotes 0.

As noted above, we also complement our district-level analyses with data from a survey of Afghan returnees. Using this individual-level survey data, we estimate a series of additional least-squares equations of the following form:

$$Y_{i,d,t} = \delta(\text{Encashment Beneficiary}_{i,d,t}) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \mu(X_{i,d,t}) + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where i indexes respondents, d indexes districts, and t indexes survey waves. $Y_{i,d,t}$ are dependent variables capturing returnees' relations with their non-migrant neighbors, including experiences of communal disputes. $\text{Encashment Beneficiary}_{i,d,t}$ is an indicator for respondents likely to have returned under the encashment program. We triangulate this measure using information on respondents' country of asylum, month of repatriation, and registration status while displaced. Under the UNHCR cash scheme, registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan were eligible for the expanded grant if they returned between July and December 2016. δ is the coefficient of interest, and captures whether, relative to other Afghan returnees, encashment beneficiaries experienced differential relations with their non-migrant neighbors. α_d and β_t are district and survey wave fixed effects. $X_{i,d,t}$ is a vector of individual-level controls including respondents' countries of asylum, months of return, and registration status, as well as demographic traits. ϵ are robust, district-clustered standard errors. All estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

5 Results

5.1 Insurgent Violence

In Table 2 we estimate the effects of encashed returns on insurgent violence. Columns 1-5 evaluate the extensive margin of combat, and columns 6-10 evaluate violence per 100,000 district residents. Columns 1 and 5 represent our most basic difference-in-differences specifications. In columns 2 and 6 we add UNHCR area-by-month fixed effects, and in columns 3 and 7 we introduce a control for the share of each district that is Pashtun interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Most Afghan refugees to Pakistan are ethnic Pashtuns, and Pashtuns also comprise the majority of Taliban fighters. Controlling for Pashtun share thus helps absorb differences in violence and return across Pashtun-dominated areas.

Table 2: Insurgent Violence and Refugee Return

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.102*** (0.036)	-0.182*** (0.062)	-0.135*** (0.052)	-0.169** (0.072)	-0.112** (0.052)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

The chief concern with our estimation strategy is endogeneity of pre-shock returnee settlement patterns, which define cross-sectional exposure to encashed returnees. Returnees are likely to settle in areas with favorable economic and security conditions (Camarena and Hägerdal, 2020; Alrababa'h et al., 2022). To account for these factors, in columns 4 and 8 we incorporate a large battery of controls, including measures related to labor market conditions, income inequality, land quality, opium production, and counterinsurgent investments

in state capacity. In columns 5 and 9 we add a lagged violence trend to further account for past security conditions in host communities.

We find that the cash grant caused a large reduction in insurgent violence along the extensive margin and in levels per capita. Estimated coefficients are precise, stable, and negative across specifications. In Table A-8 we also find increasing exposure to encashed returns reduced the intensive margin of combat. Overall, these baseline results contrast starkly with prominent accounts arguing refugees (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Milton, Spencer and Findley, 2013), and especially returnees (Harpviken and Lischer, 2013; Camarena, 2016a), exacerbate militancy. Instead, the negative effect of encashed returns on insurgent violence suggests aid reduced mobilization by facilitating returnee reintegration (Masterson and Lehmann, 2020) and raising reservation wages (Haer and Hecker, 2018).

5.2 Communal Violence

Apart from insurgent conflict, refugee return may also affect social conflict. In general, communal violence in the wake of repatriation stems from animosity and resentment between repatriates and hosts (Schwartz, 2019). Several specific dynamics are relevant. Mass repatriation can spur resource and labor market competition (Harild, Christensen and Zetter, 2015), alter local ethnic balances (Whitaker, 2003), and exacerbate criminality (Schultz, 2011; Seefar, 2019). Property disputes are an especially common cause of tension between returnees and their neighbors (Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2021). In the context of aid, hosts may also react violently when programming is perceived as disproportionately benefiting migrants (Jacobsen, 2005).

In Table 3 we explore these dynamics, focusing on how the encashment program impacted returnees' communal relations. We specifically assess encashed returnees' self-reports about their relations with their non-migrant (i.e., "stayee") neighbors. The dependent variable combines information on the incidence of disputes and discrimination, as well as perceptions of social isolation. Items are scaled so that higher values indicate better relations between returnees and stayees. All estimates are large, negative, and precise, suggesting program beneficiaries suffered worse communal relations. In substantive terms, encashment beneficiaries' relations with their neighbors were 0.13 to 0.24 standard deviations worse on average. In Tables A-9 and A-10 we corroborate these survey-based estimates using observational data we assembled on the incidence of communal clashes in Afghanistan.

Although typically less severe than insurgent attacks, social conflicts are nevertheless economically important. In Afghanistan, these disputes often involve whole villages or tribes,

Table 3: Social Conflict and Refugee Return

	Returnee-Stayee Relations Index									
	ICW					PCF				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.133** (0.056)	-0.145*** (0.054)	-0.239* (0.125)	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.178** (0.073)	-0.190*** (0.069)	-0.208* (0.112)	-0.200* (0.113)	-0.199* (0.113)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Interview Order					Yes					Yes

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW indicates an index constructed using inverse covariance-weighting. PCF indicates an index constructed using principal component factor analysis.

and are prone to protraction as they metastasize into multi-generational blood feuds (Mur-tazashvili, 2016). Communal clashes have also contributed to mine contamination, destruction of agricultural infrastructure, and harvest disruptions. Our findings hence bear key welfare implications, and reinforce prominent accounts (Schwartz, 2019) about how tensions between returnees and hosts spur social conflict. More broadly, these results highlight cross-cutting effects of UNHCR repatriation cash assistance on violence. While the grant increase attenuated insurgent violence in returnee-exposed communities, it worsened social strife.

5.3 Robustness

We conduct a number of additional tests to probe the robustness of these findings.

Naive and Instrumental Variables Estimates Our baseline models define district-level exposure to refugee returns using 2013 returnee shares. An alternative is to define

program exposure using the observed inflow of refugee returnees. To do so, we estimate a series of naive OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models in Table 4. In the naive specification, we calculate district shares of returnees from Pakistan for each month. We z-standardize this measure for interpretability, and regress the focal violence outcomes on it. Results of these models are presented in columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Table 4. A one standard deviation increase in the district-month share of encashed returns is associated with 0.161 fewer insurgent attacks per 100,000 (column 9).

Table 4: Naive and 2SLS Estimates of Insurgent Violence and Refugee Return

	Share of Returnees from Pakistan		Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs							
			Extensive Margin				Per 100K Pop.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	1 st Stage OLS	1 st Stage OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.417*** (0.062)	0.195*** (0.017)								
Share of Returnees from Pakistan			-0.002 (0.004)	-0.050*** (0.011)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.151* (0.087)	-0.908*** (0.262)	-0.161** (0.076)	-0.579** (0.254)
Observations	19104	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic				89.832		124.996		89.832		128.823
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 2013 returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Share of returnees from Pakistan is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in a given year-specific month. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

However, because returnees' choices over when and where to repatriate are endogenous, naive estimates are likely biased. To overcome this issue, we turn to an instrumental variables strategy. As in Card (2001) and Boustan (2010), we instrument for refugee return using the reduced form policy shock from the main specification. First-stage estimates in columns 1-2 establish that 2013 shares are highly correlated with actual shares.²⁷ Turning to columns 4, 6,

²⁷We observe district-month returns for 2014 and 2016-2017. Column 1 studies the correlation between shares in this full span, and column 2 studies the correlation in the focal period (2016), before and during the cash program.

8, and 10, we estimate 2SLS models. Kleibergen-Paap F statistics suggest our instrument is strong and relevant. Instrumental variables estimates match our baseline and naive estimates in substantive terms, and are larger in magnitude. A one standard deviation increase in the district-month share of encashed returns reduced the probability of insurgent violence by 6.3 percentage points (column 6) and insurgent violence per 100,000 residents by 0.579 attacks (column 10).

In Table A-11 we re-estimate these specifications while studying our supplemental measure of communal violence based on event data. As in the main, survey-based results from Table 3, we find that encashed returns increased social conflict in repatriate-receiving communities. We also consider additional sources of cross-sectional variation in exposure to encashed returns. In 2016, all registered returnees from Pakistan passed through one of three encashment centers in Kabul, Jalalabad, or Kandahar (Figure A-2), where they were interviewed and provided cash assistance. To reduce travel costs, most returnees resided closer to the facilities where they received their repatriation cash (Haroon et al., 2019). In Table A-12 we define exposure to encashed returns using a cross-sectional measure of proximity to encashment centers and find substantively similar results.

Additional Confounders and Modeling Choices We take a number of additional steps to address potential threats to identification in the online supplement. First, our main analyses focus on the effect of encashed returns (i.e., documented returns from Pakistan during the encashment program). In Table A-13 we exploit IOM estimates of spontaneous returns, and show that the main effects are specific to encashed returnees. Using our survey data we take an analogous approach and define an indicator for undocumented returnees from Pakistan during the encashment program (Table A-14). As with our panel evidence, survey results suggest that encashed returnees—but not comparable unassisted returnees—suffered distinguishably worse relations with their neighbors.

Second, earlier returnees may have a persistent effect on conflict dynamics in areas where they settle. Similarly, belligerents may anticipate future repatriation by observing historical returnee settlement patterns, and strategically allocate fighting resources in response. To more directly address these possibilities, Table A-15 confirms our core results are robust to controlling for four measures of historical conflict: total SIGACTs, counterinsurgent-initiated SIGACTs (e.g., air support), insurgent-initiated SIGACTs, and criminal-initiated SIGACTs (e.g., robbery). Using the record of SIGACTs for 2013 (Andrew C. and Wright, 2017), we sum these events by district, normalize by population, and interact these measures with

year-specific month fixed effects.

Third, Table A-17 assesses other potential confounders in relation to our combat results. van Houte (2017) shows that refugee returnees in Afghanistan are at risk of repeat displacement, and especially internal displacement. Hence, districts more impacted by repatriation may also host larger populations of internally displaced people (IDPs). Competition between returnees and IDPs over scarce jobs and housing has exacerbated strife (Haroon et al., 2019). Our core results are robust to controlling flexibly for each district’s share of the pre-program IDP population. It is also possible that violence is conditioned by ethnic relations. We attempt to account for this in our main models by controlling for the share of each district that is Pashtun. However, violence may also be more severe in areas where returnees disrupt fragile demographic balances (Whitaker, 2003). Estimates remain consistent when controlling for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. To further mitigate concerns about trends in violence differing across areas contested by insurgents, we incorporate month-specific effects of territorial control. Our core results are precise and consistent in magnitude. Further, in Table A-18 we assesses additional confounders in relation to our survey results. The negative effect of encashment on communal relations is robust to controlling for returnees’ household size, land ownership, residential settlement patterns, and reasons for return.

Finally, the main estimates on insurgent violence exploit analytic population weights, which help address heteroskedasticity and identify heterogeneous effects by district population size. Weighting more populous districts also helps address returnee gravitation toward urban centers (Petrin, 2002). Table A-19 reveals that, as expected, weighting improves precision of the core estimates.

6 Mechanisms

In this section, we describe and test several potential mechanisms underpinning our results. We begin with a focus on insurgent violence, where prior work suggests participation is linked to economic incentives.²⁸ We then investigate the roles of social capital and local institutions

²⁸We recognize the importance of immaterial incentives for mobilization, like moral outrage (Wood, 2003). We focus on political economy accounts of conflict for two reasons. First, because we leverage an *encashment* shock, it is natural to explore the impact of economic inducements. Second, our analyses are limited by the fact that we cannot observe details about returnee’s politically-salient experiences before and during displacement. For instance, we lack individual-level data on prior experiences of violence in Afghanistan, where refugees were hosted in Pakistan, or what returnees think about Afghan politics. One ripe avenue for future work is to examine how immaterial incentives intersect with economic motivations for mobilization in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

for resolving communal disputes. Here, we explicitly consider and test how social networks and other immaterial factors may help facilitate returnee reintegration.

6.1 Economic Spillovers and Reservation Wages

Participation in organized violence is linked to local economic conditions. When licit, outside options are limited, the opportunity costs of violence are diminished (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, 2013). Negative shocks in the formal economy increase rebel mobilization (Dube and Vargas, 2013) and fighting capacity (Wright, 2020), particularly where rebels hold lootable resources (Vanden Eynde, 2018). In response, governments have implemented a range of developmental policies to offset the returns to militancy. These interventions include humanitarian aid, community driven development, cash-for-guns schemes, and conditional cash transfers (Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2014; Sexton, 2016; Child, 2019). Employment schemes that provide financial support also reduce risks of mobilization (Blattman and Annan, 2016). The broader aim of these policies is to stimulate the licit economy. By raising wages, positive economic shocks reduce militant recruitment and capacity (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Wright, 2020). If reservation wages increase without any corresponding increase in the returns to conflict (i.e., increasing compensation for mobilization), participation in violence will decline overall.

We extend these insights by considering inter-household economic spillovers owing to the returnee cash program. If a household level transfer is of a sufficient scale, it may generate positive intra-communal externalities.²⁹ As local economic conditions improve, reservation wages for household members (who benefit from the direct transfer) and their neighbors (who benefit indirectly) increase. If reservation wages increase enough to diminish the mobilization capacity of incumbent insurgent groups, militant violence will decline. Above all, mobilization-strapped insurgents should respond to rising reservation wages by reducing labor-intensive attacks, such as frontal assaults on government outposts, which require significant numbers of fighters to perpetrate. To offset this reduction in personnel-heavy fighting, insurgents may also reallocate into capital-intensive tactics, such as roadside bombings, which can be carried out by few—or even lone—fighters.³⁰

²⁹Kreibaum (2016) highlights community-level spillovers from refugee settlements.

³⁰The overall reduction in insurgent violence is consistent with another mechanism: aid as prize (Nunn and Qian, 2014). This argument is developed for the refugee case in Lehmann (2020), where insurgents may reduce combat activity to maximize the number of returnees that can later be taxed. In the Afghan case, this would be analogous to Fetzer et al. (2021), who find that insurgents reduced violence strategically to

To assess the plausibility of intra-communal economic spillovers, we investigate the downstream consequences of an increase in reservation wages on rebel tactics. We leverage supplemental details in the INDURE records to do so. First, we separately estimate the effects of refugee return on direct fire, indirect fire, and explosive events.³¹ If the encashment program raised reservation wages in impacted communities, we should observe a reduction in levels of insurgent-initiated direct and indirect fires, and increasing use of explosive attacks.

These expectations directly follow from insights on Taliban force employment (Sonin and Wright, 2022). Direct fires are most labor-intensive because these require coordinated teams of insurgents directing close-range fire. Indirect fires are also relatively more labor-intensive than IEDs, requiring coordination between insurgents to set-up and launch heavy weapons against distant counterinsurgent positions. In contrast, explosive attacks are typically perpetrated in the form of roadside bombings, with one or a few insurgents planting IEDs along convoy routes. In our case, these stylized facts suggest the labor-intensivity of violence is inversely related to capital-intensivity. Direct and indirect fires are least capital-intensive, employing readily available arms. Explosives require a higher degree of technical expertise to produce and emplace; during the conflict, insurgents also invested significant resources to defeat evolving counter-IED capabilities (Trebbi et al., 2020).

Results in Table 5 provide initial support. For reference, in columns 1 and 5 we provide our benchmark estimate of the effect of encashed return on insurgent violence based on columns 5 and 10 of Table 2. In columns 2-4, we separately estimate the focal specification for the extensive margin of direct fires, indirect fires, and explosive hazards. Columns 6-8 report comparable results for tactics per capita. Encashed returns significantly reduced direct and indirect fires, with most of the overall reduction in insurgent violence stemming from a reduction in the most labor-intensive tactic—direct fires. In contrast, encashment increased the probability of capital-intensive, explosive violence by 1.8 percentage points (column 4). Estimates on explosions per capita are small in magnitude and indistinguishable. Together, these results offer illustrative support for the wage mechanism we posit.

facilitate the withdrawal of international troops. If insurgents calibrated their use of violence to maximize civilian welfare while continuing to engage in combat, we anticipate this would have resulted in greater direct and indirect fire attacks and fewer explosive hazards, since the primary cause of civilian casualties during the Afghan conflict was IEDs. As we describe below, this is the inverse of the disaggregated pattern we observe.

³¹Direct fires are attacks using projectile-fired weapons and perpetrated within the line-of-sight of the target. Small arms fire is an example of a direct fire. Indirect fires are also projectile-fired attacks, but unlike direct fires, these attacks are perpetrated beyond the line-of-sight, aimed at targets far from the firing platform. Rocket and mortar attacks are examples of indirect fires. Explosive attacks are bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or mines.

Table 5: Refugee Return and Tactical Heterogeneity

	Tactical Diversity							
	Extensive Margin				Per 100k Pop.			
	(1) Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs	(2) Direct Fires	(3) Indirect Fires	(4) Explosions	(5) Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs	(6) Direct Fires	(7) Indirect Fires	(8) Explosions
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.008* (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	-0.112** (0.052)	-0.066* (0.039)	-0.035*** (0.010)	-0.023 (0.018)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS								
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

Yet, changes in insurgent tactical portfolios are merely suggestive. To provide further evidence, we study lethality, using casualty records attached to INDURE that document the number of counterinsurgent forces killed or wounded in each attack.³² We specifically consider the average lethality of insurgent attacks, as well as the tactic-specific lethality (i.e., the average number of counterinsurgents killed in attacks of each tactic).³³ Lethality rates offer a clearer window into reservation wages because the lethality of violence is a function of its input intensity. If the encashment program raised reservation wages, constraining insurgent recruitment, it should cause insurgents to deploy smaller attack teams capable of inflicting less harm on counterinsurgents. In other words, rising reservation wages imply declining effectiveness of direct and indirect fires. At the same time, insurgents may adapt by allocating more resources into capital-intensive attacks, such as larger or more sophisticated IEDs, which can be emplaced in spite of high reservation wages, and which enable insurgents to maintain lethality in the face of reduced mobilization. In other words, rising reservation wages imply increasing lethality of explosive violence if fighting capacity is substituted from labor to capital.

³²We do not observe civilian casualties, but in general these are highest in explosive attacks, which are least discriminate.

³³Because the lethality rate is undefined when no insurgent violence occurs, we fill these observations with zeroes.

Table 6: Refugee Return and Insurgent Lethality

	Lethality Rate	Tactic-Specific Lethality Rate		
	(1) Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs	(2) Direct Fires	(3) Indirect Fires	(4) Explosions
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.032** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.007)	-0.008* (0.004)	0.075*** (0.021)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence (=1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Violence (=1) is an indicator for whether any attacks of the respective type occurred. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

In Table 6 we provide evidence that encashment induced these shifts in insurgent lethality. Taking our core specification from columns 5 and 10 of Table 2, we study the average number of counterinsurgent casualties per attack (column 1) and per tactic (columns 2-4). Program-triggered returns are associated with a large reduction in the number of counterinsurgent casualties per direct fire attack, and a modest reduction in the lethality of indirect fires. However, these effects are compensated by increasing lethality of explosive attacks in impacted districts. Indeed, rising effectiveness of explosive violence yields an aggregate increase in the lethality of overall insurgent violence.

One limitation of these analyses is that we anticipate composition shifts, but our dependent variables cannot reveal relative substitution; that is, rising employment or lethality of capital-intensive violence as a proportion of total violence. The share-based outcomes we study in Table A-20 are better-suited to test these effects. We specifically probe two outcomes: the share of all insurgent attacks that are explosive, and the share of all counterinsurgent casualties from explosive attacks. Precise positive coefficients for both outcomes indicate the repatriation assistance program caused insurgent substitution from labor-intensive into capital-intensive violence, which also grew more lethal. Together, these results are indicative

of positive externalities—namely, rising reservation wages—from returnee cash assistance in impacted communities. More generally, these findings comport with evidence that aid to refugees may benefit hosts by spilling over to non-beneficiary, non-migrant neighbors (Masterson and Lehmann, 2020; Zhou and Andrew C., 2021), raising community-wide wages.

6.2 Economic Spillovers and Civilian Informing

Information is a paramount constraint on insurgent and counterinsurgent violence (Kalyvas, 2006). With information, belligerents can selectively target adversaries, improving battlefield success (Sonin and Wright, 2022). Local economic conditions shape tip flows from civilians, in addition to the opportunity costs of mobilization. Counterinsurgents exchange outreach and development to “buy” tips, cultivating collaboration through service provision (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011). In a market for tips, negative economic shocks reduce the cost of information, increasing civilian collaboration with the government (Vanden Eynde, 2018). Conversely, positive economic shocks raise the price at which potential collaborators are willing to provide information to counterinsurgents.

Extending these insights, we explore how repatriation cash assistance shaped civilian informing. The program we study was unique. Cash for returnees was granted by an independent third-party, the UNHCR. As such, it is unlikely that civilians viewed the aid as an anti-insurgent investment, and rewarded counterinsurgents for issuing it.³⁴ In addition, evidence suggests the encashment program induced inter-household spillovers from returnees to non-migrant hosts. Where whole communities benefited from the program, improved welfare would increase the price of tips, reducing information flows to counterinsurgents.³⁵ That is, positive intra-communal spillovers from repatriation assistance may both reduce rebel mobilization through an opportunity cost channel, and reduce counterinsurgent effectiveness through an information channel.

We do not observe civilian tips in the INDURE data we use. Instead, we investigate how repatriation affected counterinsurgent bomb neutralizations, an outcome highly sensitive to civilian informing (Sonin and Wright, 2022). When civilians provide more information, government forces are better able to interdict explosive hazards before detonation.

³⁴Encashed returnees correctly attributed UNHCR as the source of aid (Table A-1).

³⁵US/NATO forces in Afghanistan had vast fiscal resources, and hence were unconstrained by small-scale increases in the cost of information. However, Afghan forces had primary responsibility for counterinsurgency in the period we study. These forces were highly budget constrained, meaning small increases in the price of tips had large effects on information flows.

Table 7: Counterinsurgent Bomb Neutralizations

	Counterinsurgent Bomb Neutralizations									
	Clearance Rate (Missing)					Clearance Rate (Filled)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Observations	1624	1619	1619	1619	1007	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	271	271	271	271	179	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes					Yes
Emplaced (=1)						Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Emplaced (=1) is an indicator for whether any explosive emplacements occurred. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

In Table 7 we study the share of emplaced explosives detected and cleared by government forces prior to detonation. This measure is defined as $\frac{\text{Explosives Found and Cleared}_{d,t}}{\text{Explosives Emplaced}_{d,t}}$. In columns 1-4 (Clearance Rate Missing) we use this quantity as is, dropping observations in which no explosives were emplaced. In columns 5-8 (Clearance Rate Filled) we fill observations with 0 when no explosives were emplaced. In these models we also control for an indicator for whether any explosives were emplaced.

Results suggest the repatriation program reduced government success in neutralizing insurgent bombs. In tandem with the evidence on tactical heterogeneity, these findings suggest that insurgents strategically reallocated fighting effort in response to mobilization constraints, and capitalized on reduced civilian collaboration with counterinsurgents. These results also highlight a salient potential cost of repatriation aid during conflicts—declining counterinsurgent effectiveness resulting from reduced informing.

6.3 Social Conflict and Social Capital

Refugee return may fuel communal violence through several channels. An influx of returnees could disrupt the balance of power between local tribes or ethnic groups (Whitaker, 2003), trigger status anxiety and fears over labor market competition (Kamminga and Zaki, 2018), or challenge informal property rights (Schwartz, 2019). Conflicts emerge through these

various channels because of a lack of social capital—ties between returnees and host communities. These mechanisms are particularly relevant in Afghanistan, where familial and clan ties, tribal affiliations, and ethnic identities play an outsized role in village-level politics (Barfield, 2010).

We anticipate that social capital is central to the link between refugee return and communal violence. Where returnees repatriate to areas they originated from, they hold preexisting community ties, which ease reintegration and mitigate backlash.³⁶ By contrast, conflict should be more severe in areas where returnees lack ties and are more socially distant from their neighbors. As Kamminga and Zaki (2018, 3) explain, “[r]eturnees who are unable or afraid to return to their region of origin are generally worse off than those who can. They tend to have fewer employment opportunities, and less access to land, patronage and support from families.”

We leverage unique information in our survey results about returnees’ neighborhood settlement patterns in order to investigate the offsetting role of social capital. In particular, we draw on two survey questions about the social composition of returnees’ neighborhoods in destination communities (see also Table A-18). The first question we study captures self-reports about whether returnees selected their destination communities in order to be near family, co-ethnics, or other returnees. The second question we study captures returnees’ self-reports that they reside near familial kin or other repatriates. We combine responses to these items to produce an inverse covariance-weighted social capital index reflective of the density of returnees’ social connections.

Results in Table 8 confirm the essential role of social capital in mitigating communal conflict after repatriation. Columns 1 and 7 provide our benchmark estimates from columns 5 and 10 of Table 3 for reference. Columns 2-6 and 8-12 study the moderating effects of social capital as proxied by neighborhood-level settlement patterns, and specifically, proximity to kin. Where encashed returnees lacked kinship ties and social networks they experienced significantly worse communal relations, while returnees experienced more positive community relations and lower risks of communal violence where they held social capital. These results are robust to using an alternative social capital index constructed from principal component factors (Table A-21), and to controlling for historical conflict dynamics (Table A-23).

³⁶It is possible, as Schwartz (2019) points out, that pre-existing family or kinship ties may exacerbate conflict upon return. For instance, land disputes may emerge between those family members that stayed and those who left and subsequently returned. In the Afghan context, family networks and kinship ties are central to informal governance. Hence, we anticipate and find evidence suggesting familial proximity and connectedness reduce the potential for communal conflict.

Table 8: Social Capital Dampens Return-Induced Social Conflict

	Returnee-Stayee Relations Index											
	ICW						PCF					
	(1) Baseline	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Baseline	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.142** (0.057)	-0.153*** (0.054)	-0.241* (0.126)	-0.235* (0.126)	-0.235* (0.126)	-0.199* (0.113)	-0.186** (0.076)	-0.197*** (0.071)	-0.209* (0.111)	-0.202* (0.112)	-0.201* (0.112)
Encashment Beneficiary x Social Capital		0.196*** (0.054)	0.201*** (0.051)	0.192*** (0.055)	0.192*** (0.055)	0.191*** (0.054)		0.182** (0.076)	0.188** (0.072)	0.176** (0.076)	0.176** (0.075)	0.176** (0.075)
Social Capital		0.063*** (0.020)	0.055*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.055*** (0.019)		0.067*** (0.018)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.017)	0.056*** (0.018)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS												
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes					Yes	Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Social capital is an inverse covariance-weighted index of social connections to familial kin and other returnees. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW indicates an index constructed using inverse covariance-weighting. PCF indicates an index constructed using principal component factor analysis.

In Tables A-22 and A-24 we investigate the conflict-dampening effects of social capital further using our supplemental event data on communal feuds. To evaluate the role of social capital in these specifications we use granular data linking returnees' settlement patterns with their regions of origin. Specifically, UNHCR records describe the district and province of origin for each group of documented returnees. We interact the reduced-form, 2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase, with two continuous measures capturing the 2013 share of returnees to: (1) a district in the same province from which they originated; and (2) the same district from which they originated. Consistent results emerge, suggesting familial kinship networks in destination communities are central to blunting return-induced social conflict.

6.4 Social Conflict and Informal Institutions

In the appendix we also investigate the potential conflict-dampening role of local institutions for dispute resolution. As with social capital, institutional mechanisms for resolving interpersonal and intra-communal conflicts may blunt tensions between returnees and stayees. In

particular, strong local institutions can facilitate bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement, and thereby stop disputes from escalating to violence (Blattman, Hartman and Blair, 2014). These institutions are particularly relevant in Afghanistan where, after centuries of weak national governance, conflict resolution has been largely devolved to informal, village-level institutions (Murtazashvili, 2016). Shuras, for example, use customary law and traditional norms to litigate disputes between villagers. The Taliban similarly engage in governance, deploying judges and providing enforcement in rural communities. Reliance on these informal or rebel-led systems for dispute resolution has been reinforced by two decades of failed judicial reform and rampant corruption among government bureaucrats. We anticipate that where these informal institutions for dispute resolution are strong, communal violence in the wake of the encashment shock may be offset.

Unfortunately, the Survey of Afghan Returnees, from which we draw our main communal relations measure, does not include relevant information on local institutional quality. Instead, to assess whether the strength of informal institutions moderates the effect of refugee return on social conflict, we rely on our supplementary event data on communal disputes. We develop four cross-sectional measures of local institutional quality (Table A-25) and interact these with the reduced-form, 2013 Returnee Share $\times$ Grant Increase. First, we use data from the NATO-funded Afghanistan Quarterly Nationwide Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey. With ANQAR data from 2013, we measure district average responses on: the preference for dispute resolution via local shuras, the preference for solving problems via elders, and whether individuals who had experienced disputes resolved them via a local shura. Second, we leverage novel data from ACSOR, the firm that administers ANQAR, on the location of districts under Taliban influence. These data identify areas where insurgents are able to intercede in local governance and provide enforcement. We measure influence using the 2013 base period.

Consistent with expectations, Table A-26 shows return only sparks communal violence where local institutions are weaker (i.e., districts with less reliance on shuras/elders, or without Taliban control). In districts with strong, informal dispute resolution mechanisms, return is negatively associated with social conflict. It is reasonable to wonder whether districts with strong, local institutions are less violent in the first place. Promisingly, we find consistent results when controlling for historical SIGACTs (Table A-27). An implication of these findings is that international actors should prioritize building legitimate local institutions before seeking to facilitate refugee return. The most effective repatriation efforts will engage informal dispute resolution mechanisms in the peacebuilding process as a means of

mitigating risks of social conflict.

7 Conclusion

Our findings address important gaps in the study of refugee return during and after conflict. Prior work has made important advances in the study of repatriation, but has primarily focused on factors that motivate the decision to return using macro-level indicators or survey-based measures. Our primary contribution is to focus on a large-scale influx of refugee returnees induced by an unexpected shift in compensation for repatriation. We combine novel subnational and survey-based measures, and provide a rich exploration of mechanisms that help explain why refugee return may trigger some forms of political or social violence but not others.

The evidence we present suggests that refugee return is associated with an overall reduction, as well as a composition shift, in insurgent violence. We provide a theoretical microfoundation for this shift, noting that the cash transfer that induced repatriation may have stimulated local economic activity in areas where returnees settled. These results support a long-standing theoretical account for rebel recruitment, namely opportunity costs. As reservation wages rise and rebel capacity remains fixed, production of (personnel-intensive) violence becomes more costly. We also find evidence consistent with a theoretical mechanism proposed by [Berman, Shapiro and Felter \(2011\)](#), namely that the market for collaboration responds to economic shocks as well. Following the cash transfer program, we observe a decline in bomb neutralizations, likely driven by a decline in information-sharing about the location of roadside bombs.

Our findings also illustrate which mechanisms can play a role in mitigating intra-communal conflict. Social capital and preexisting kinship ties moderate the potential for refugee repatriation to spark local conflicts. Recent work has shed light on optimal settlement strategies when refugees aim to rebuild their lives in host countries ([Bansak et al., 2018](#)). Our results clarify how a similar intervention could be used to evaluate when, where, and with whom returning refugees should be located. Although the decision to repatriate and where to settle remains the right of the returnee, it may be possible to encourage targeted resettlement in a manner that reduces the potential for local clashes ([Gerver, 2018a](#)).

At the same time, resettlement patterns could be used to strategically deploy additional governance resources, especially institutions for preempting conflicts before they emerge or resolve disputes after they have. In particular, our evidence suggests that local institutions

for conflict mediation may play a critical role. We anticipate that local support for conflict resolution could also be tied to preexisting risk factors including customary land tenure, livestock grazing patterns, vulnerability of irrigation networks, and heterogeneous ethnic settlement patterns.

The impacts of refugee repatriation are nuanced. So too are the ethical considerations relevant to programmatic interventions aimed at facilitating return. These challenges are exacerbated when international organizations and policy-makers consider how best to address displacement during an active conflict (Harrell-Bond, 1989; Stein and Cuny, 1994; Long, 2013). If repatriation assistance is employed to appease asylum countries eager to reduce their refugee-hosting burden, it risks inadvertently incentivizing coercive tactics and degrading the voluntariness of repatriation (Gerver, 2018a). Eroding the voluntariness of return and the free choice of refugees risks breaching fundamental principles of international law, including *non-refoulement*. Repatriation must occur under safe conditions when refugees themselves opt to return. Our findings do not suggest that offering cash-for-return is an optimal policy strategy, either ethically or practically. Among other consequences, we find that the encashment program spurred communal violence and increased insurgent lethality, both of which are normatively and practically negative. Crafting sound policies requires considering the human rights issues at stake, how combatants may benefit from the return of vulnerable populations, the quality of institutions to manage local tensions, and the ethical obligations of host countries and international organizations.

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APPENDIX [FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY]

Christopher W. Blair and Austin L. Wright

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
A Empirical Appendix

In this brief empirical appendix, we introduce supplemental results.

A.1 Wave Dynamics in Global Refugee Return

Forced displacement often occurs in waves (Holland and Peters, 2020). Repatriation from Pakistan to Afghanistan spiked in 1992 upon collapse of the communist PDPA government, in 2002 after the Taliban collapse, and in 2016 after the UNHCR encashment program. We study the 2016 return shock, but comparable wave/spike dynamics emerge in numerous other contexts around the worldwide.

Figure A-1: Wave Dynamics in Global Refugee Return




Note: Panels depict refugee returns to Myanmar, Iraq, Mozambique, and Serbia over time. All data come from the UNHCR PopStats database.

A.2 The UNHCR Encashment Process

Under the 2016 UNHCR program, all registered Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan and holding a valid Proof of Registration (PoR) card were eligible to repatriate with UNHCR assistance. Individuals with no PoR card or who had returned and received assistance in previous years were not eligible for assistance. The procedures of encashed return were as follows.

Figure A-2: UNHCR Procedures for Afghan Return from Pakistan



Note: Gray dots mark Afghan refugee settlements in Pakistan. Purple tents mark Voluntary Repatriation Centres (VRCs) in Pakistan. Black triangles mark border crossings through which returnees re-entered Afghanistan after processing at VRCs. Red reticles (crosshairs) mark Encashment Centres (ECs) where returnees collected cash payments, and from which they returned to destination districts. Districts are shaded according to their UNHCR area of responsibility.

First, registered Afghan refugees wishing to return would approach the nearest UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Centre (VRC). Two long-standing VRCs were operated in Baleli, Quetta, Pakistan and Chamkani, Peshawar, Pakistan. A third VRC was opened at Azakhel, Peshawar, Pakistan in September 2016 to help process the mass flow of intended returnees during the program. At the VRC, refugees were de-registered from the Pakistani system, had

their PoR cards invalidated, and were issued with Voluntary Repatriation Forms (VRFs). All returning family members had to be present at the VRC to declare their return, and an iris scan or thumb impression was conducted on all returnees over five years of age to ensure that no one received assistance twice.

Following PoR invalidation, refugees no longer held legal status in Pakistan. However, VRF forms allowed safe travel under UNHCR supervision between the VRC and the nearest border crossing. Designated routes were specified for returnees to travel from VRCs to border crossings, and returns were processed through one of three border crossings: Torkham, Chaman, or Kharlachi. No customs or fees were assessed on household items and goods brought by returning refugees.

Once across the border into Afghanistan, all registered returnees had to travel to one of three Encashment Centres (ECs). The three ECs processing returnees from Pakistan were Jamail Mayna in Kandahar, Samar Khail in Nangarhar, and the Returnee Centre in Kabul. To ensure timely return, UNHCR required that returnees must approach an EC within seven days of having been issued a VRF in Pakistan. Returnees who failed to arrive at an EC in the requisite seven day period would not receive cash assistance, though exceptions were made for groups who experienced death or serious illness of a family member between the time of VRF issuance and EC arrival. No cash assistance was ever provided to returnees arriving more than 15 days after VRF issuance.

At ECs in Afghanistan, returning refugees were given several important trainings. In particular, returnees were briefed on mine awareness and access to education in Afghanistan. In addition, basic health services were provided, and all children five years of age or younger were vaccinated for measles and polio. Interviews were also conducted with returnees at ECs. During interviews, returnees could report instances of bribery and extortion during the journey from VRCs.

The most important procedure at ECs was cash distribution. On average, each returnee during the 2016 program received \$400 in cash, up from an average grant of \$200 given before (and after) the program. The average \$400 grant consisted of \$350 for short-term integration and \$30-70 for transportation costs. The transportation grant varied according to the travel distance from a refugee returnee's area of residence in Pakistan to their area of origin in Afghanistan. After encashment, all returnees were free to leave the EC and repatriate to their intended destination community.

A.3 The Encashment Program and Coercion in Pakistan

The repatriation cash assistance scheme we study was implemented by UNHCR in response to Pakistani efforts to reduce the Afghan refugee population hosted in the country's tribal areas. As described in the main text, the program resulted from more than a year of negotiations between UNHCR and the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in consultation

with a shura of Afghan refugees. Throughout the period in the lead-up to the program, and for several months after the program began, Pakistan engaged in a parallel campaign to coerce Afghan returns. To contextualize these developments, we offer brief background below. Interested readers may also consult [Bjelica \(2016\)](#) and [Human Rights Watch \(2017\)](#).

Pakistan's insistence on reducing its hosting burden grew out of two major issues in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations: (1) the 2014 Peshawar school attack; and (2) growing economic ties between Afghanistan and India, Pakistan's major geopolitical rival. First, on December 16, 2014, six Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants killed 149 people in an attack on a school in Peshawar, Pakistan. Although no Afghan refugees were involved in the violence, the attack spurred a wave of anti-Afghan xenophobia. The Pakistani government contributed to this xenophobic backlash by claiming the attack was planned in Afghanistan, and identifying two of the six perpetrators as (non-refugee) Afghans. In response to rising anti-Afghan sentiment, Afghan refugees in Pakistan reported retributive evictions and job losses, extensive police harassment, and an increasingly coercive environment throughout 2015 ([Bjelica, 2016](#); [Human Rights Watch, 2017](#)). The Pakistani government exerted additional pressure in 2015 when it changed its policy on refugees' Proof-of-Registration (PoR) cards, which governed refugees' access to key rights (e.g., free movement), goods (e.g., mobile SIM cards), and government services (e.g., work permits) ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 40). PoR cards expired on December 31, 2015, and Pakistani officials delayed granting an extension until January 12, 2016, creating status insecurity for refugees. Whereas previous extensions applied for at least one year, the January 2016 extension expired on June 30, 2016. Legal uncertainty over the PoR issue fueled rumors of deportation among Afghans in Pakistan ([Seefar, 2019](#)). Figure A-3 below also highlights increasing anti-refugee harassment in Pakistan throughout 2015.


Second, in 2015 and early 2016, Pakistan also increased pressure on Afghan refugees in retribution for friendly overtures between Afghanistan and India. In particular, in response to worsening relations with Pakistan in 2014 and 2015, Afghanistan began deeper pursuit of trade ties with India. The result was a series of bilateral agreements, the largest of which was the India-Afghanistan Friendship Dam announced in December 2015 ([Bjelica, 2016](#)). The dam was one of several Indo-Afghan projects agreed in the pre-program period that were particularly concerning for Pakistan, since these projects aimed at diversifying Afghanistan's trade and energy infrastructure away from Pakistan ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 16-17). Afghan cooperation with India exacerbated prevailing anti-Afghan sentiment in Pakistan, and further incentivized manipulation of PoR expiration.

In June 2016, Pakistan leveraged the threat of PoR expiration—levied in private negotiations with UNHCR—to compel the UNHCR to facilitate refugee returns via the cash program. Specifically, the cash program began on June 29, 2016, one day before Pakistan was slated to allow the expiration of PoR cards held by Afghans in Pakistan. Guaranteeing an extension on PoR cards was a top UNHCR priority, since PoR access is key for refugee

integration and protection. Program implementation was timed around the June 30, 2016 expiration deadline imposed by Pakistan, and was determined in secret negotiations between Pakistan and the UNHCR. In response to the UNHCR program, Pakistan re-authorized and extended refugee cards through December 31, 2016. Extensions on PoR cards have subsequently been granted in three or six month increments.

Reporting by [Human Rights Watch](#) (2017, 18-27) indicates that in summer 2016, after the cash program had begun, Pakistani police and landlords continued to pursue anti-refugee harassment, including bribe-taking, rent hikes, and arbitrary increases in fees for access to documents and services. These specific forms of coercion are all consistent with predation following the unexpected windfall in returnee support. In short, the program likely motivated these forms of economic coercion. Figure A-4 clarifies this point.

Figure A-3: Anti-Refugee Coercion in Pakistan



Note: The solid line shows deportations of Afghans from Pakistan. Dashed red lines denote mean levels of deportation before and during the repatriation cash program. Gray bars denote the period of the repatriation cash program. We extract data on deportations from IOM reports.

To better understand anti-refugee coercion in Pakistan, we plot deportations of Afghans from Pakistan over time in Figure A-3. Deportations are highly correlated with broader, anti-refugee repression ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#); [Seefar, 2019](#)), and so can help illuminate relevant trends in harassment and abuse. Levels of deportations are high and increasing throughout much of the pre-program period. The start of the program coincides with a mod-

est uptick in coercion that then sharply decreases after September 2016. Overall, the average number of deportations per month is slightly lower during the encashment program than before.


Of course, anti-refugee coercion in Pakistan before and during the cash program raises natural identification concerns. In order to bias our estimations, coercion in Pakistan would have had to escalate at the same time the program was implemented. Yet, as reporting by Bjelica (2016) and Human Rights Watch (2017) makes clear, coercion was an enduring feature of the period from December 2014 through September 2016—a period spanning 18 months before the cash program and the first 4 months of the program itself. Figure A-3 makes this explicit—deportations were actually greater before than during the cash program. If coercion was primarily driving the returns we study, we would expect to see large increases in return in the pre-program period, but we do not (Figure 2). Instead, returns spike shortly after the encashment program began and subside directly as it ended. Moreover, while undocumented returns historically exceeded documented returns in Afghanistan, this trend reversed during the encashment program (Figure 2). This pattern is highly suggestive of returnees making conscious efforts to repatriate through formal channels to obtain the cash grant.

To further assuage concerns, we provide multiple additional pieces of evidence. First, we formalize our design with a directed graph, which clarifies key parameters of interest (Figure A-4). Second, in Table A-3 we present survey evidence on returnees’ self-reported reasons for return. We find no evidence that program beneficiaries were more likely to report repatriating because of repressive conditions in Pakistan. Third, in Section A.4 we highlight qualitative evidence from interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch (2017), which underscores the importance of cash assistance in enabling repatriation. Fourth, we show that our focal effects are unique to encashed returns. In contrast, undocumented returnees—who did not receive cash assistance—had no distinguishable effects on conflict (Table A-13). By demonstrating that non-beneficiary returnees who repatriated during the program period did not impact the conflict, we offer strong suggestive evidence that cash assistance is the core mechanism.

Directed Graph Some subset of the variation in return may have been purely motivated by the cash assistance program, even in the absence of coercion, while another subset was motivated by the combination of these factors. We lay out this causal chain as a directed graph in Figure A-4. Note that the direct effect of policy-induced return on conflict is captured in β'_1 , while the indirect effect of the policy on return, mediated by coercion, is captured by β''_1 . What we estimate in the main specification is the reduced form combination of these pathways. We can call this parameter β_1 . We cannot separately estimate β'_1 and β''_1 . Yet, we provide multiple points of evidence for the importance of the cash mechanism.

Leveraging the notation in Figure A-4, we can account for a secondary pathway through

Figure A-4: Directed Graph on Encashment, Coercion, and Refugee Return



Note: Directed graph clarifying mapping between conceptual mechanisms and estimated quantities in research design. Parameters are intended to capture the reduced form effect of each parameter through the corresponding, total pathway. Dashed lines indicate unlikely direct causal pathways.

which coercion that escalated after the program’s announcement impacted violence in Afghanistan: β_2 . Unregistered returns during the period of the encashment program—the type of returns most likely to be caused by any escalating coercion (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Seefar, 2019)—did not have the same effect on conflict in Afghanistan as encashed returns. We provide evidence of this point in Table A-13, where we consider the impact of spontaneous, unregistered returns. These returnees may have been influenced by coercion during the program period, but were not eligible for cash assistance. While we cannot recover β_1'' , we can estimate β_2 . If β_1 remains robust while accounting for the channel captured in β_2 , this suggests the reduced form evidence in the main specification is not contaminated by the other pathway through which coercion influenced return (i.e., return without cash aid). Furthermore, if β_1 is distinct from β_2 in magnitude and/or sign, this suggests the dominant driver of return-related shifts in conflict is due to the presence of financial assistance and not just the escalation of coercion. On the other hand, we should see similar effects of both registered (i.e., encashed) return and unregistered (i.e., spontaneous, undocumented, un-encashed) return on conflict in Afghanistan if escalating coercion and not cash assistance is the main mechanism. Using data on undocumented returns from the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, we re-estimate our focal specifications while adding a term for the undocumented returnee share interacted with an indicator for the grant period (Table A-13). These results show that the main effects are robust, and unique to documented returnees who received repatriation cash assistance. In contrast, effects are null or opposite for undocumented returnees, who did not receive cash assistance. We provide an additional discussion of these tests in Section A.16.

A.4 Qualitative Evidence on Encashment and Coercion

As described in [Human Rights Watch \(2017\)](#), Human Rights Watch (HRW) officials interviewed 92 Afghan refugee returnees to Kabul between October 26 and November 1, 2016. Quotes from these interviews are revealing, and suggest that the UNHCR cash program we study played a central role in returnees’ decisionmaking. Indeed, as early as 2014—before the expanded cash program we study—when average assistance was just \$200, UNHCR had found that “more than 30% of Afghan returnees ... cited UNHCR assistance packages as a pull factor to return” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 41). In HRW’s subsequent interviews, although many returnees also cite the role of Pakistani coercion as a push factor, they note that cash assistance is generally what made return feasible. In other words, their return would likely not have happened in the absence of the cash assistance program we study. Excerpts below underscore these points.

- “Fearing destitution in Afghanistan, the doubling of the UNHCR cash grant to returnees was a critical factor their decision to leave.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 25)
- “Numerous returning Afghan refugees told Human Rights Watch they would have been too poor to leave without UNHCR’s money.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 26)
- “[A 33-year-old Afghan refugee in Mardan, Pakistan] finally decided to leave because he was afraid that if he didn’t, he risked deportation alone and with nothing, instead of leaving with his family and almost \$3,000.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 26)
- “Others fearing destitution in Afghanistan said that UNHCR money was their only hope of surviving after leaving Pakistan; and that without the money they would have remained in Pakistan and hoped the government would treat them better in 2017.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 26)
- “Many returning Afghan refugees told Human Rights Watch that UNHCR’s cash hand-out was an important factor in their decision to return after Pakistani police abuses started.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 40)
- “Many Afghan refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that UNHCR’s cash grant was key to taking the decision to return to Afghanistan. UNHCR told Human Rights Watch that many of the returnees it interviewed in Kabul and Jalalabad said the same.” ([Human Rights Watch, 2017](#), 49)

A.5 Measuring Communal Violence

Our military records offer a comprehensive portrait of combat between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. However, these data do not track social conflicts occurring between civilians, tribes, or other groups. We draw on rich survey data to understand communal violence and returnee relations with their non-migrant neighbors in the main analyses. However, in supplementary analyses we also consider incidents of communal violence recorded in an original dataset we assembled. To measure communal strife, we draw on a US government-sponsored conflict tracker, which covers 2016-2017 and combines incidents reported by the Afghan National Police Command Center, open-source media, and embassy-contracted risk analysis firms. For each event in the tracker we observe geographic coordinates, a timestamp, and an incident description. While most events refer to (counter)insurgent violence, a subset of the records cover social strife.

Communal violence characterizes incidents of extra-governmental conflict between informally-organized groups in which neither state nor rebel forces are a primary target or perpetrator. Communal violence excludes conflicts involving pro-government militias, as these groups are formally organized. Government or rebel forces may respond to communal violence so long as they are not primary targets. As [Murtazashvili \(2016\)](#) describes, this form of violence includes land and property disputes, honor feuds, and tribal or familial clashes. We use supervised keyword text analysis to search and code events on the basis of incident descriptions. This exercise benefits from standard terminological conventions in each narrative. For instance, most incidents involving insurgent attacks begin “INS conducted [tactic].” [Sex-ton \(2016\)](#) offers a similar approach. Most narratives are general, and do not allow us to distinguish types of social conflicts, or to identify specific disputes involving returnees. To illustrate, we describe two incidents below:

Date: 12:00, 24 March 2016

Location: Qadis District, Badghis Province

Narrative: “Due to private enmity between two tribes in Qadis village of the mentioned district fought to each other and as result (1) got killed from one side and the other (1) wounded from other side.”

Date: 11:30, 17 December 2016

Location: Hazrati Sultan District, Samangan Province

Narrative: “As a result of conflict between two tribes in Ghazni Gak village of the mentioned District, due to land issues, Consequently (05) LNs [local nationals] injured, ANP [Afghan National Police] assigned to the area.”



In total, we identify 122 incidents of communal violence across Afghanistan in 2016, including 48 events during the encashment program. Although we believe our data represent the most complete accounting of social conflict in Afghanistan during this period, it is likely that this violence is under-reported. Measurement error in these data would increase the variance of our estimates, reducing precision of our results. To further mitigate possible

under-reporting, we study the extensive margin of communal violence in our primary estimations using this alternative measure. Results are substantively similar when we assess communal violence in levels or per capita.

Figure A-5: Survey-Based and Observational Measures of Communal Violence



(a) Survey Data: Returnee-Stayee Relations

(b) Survey Data: Communal Violence



(c) Survey Data: Linguistic Discrimination

(d) Event Data: Communal Violence



Note: Panel (a) represents average responses on a survey-based, multi-item index measuring relations between returnees and their non-migrant neighbors (i.e., “stayees”). In this case, darker shades indicate more positive relations. Panel (b) represents average responses to a survey item measuring returnees’ self-reported experiences of communal violence. Panel (c) represents average responses to a survey item measuring returnees’ self-reported experiences of linguistic discrimination. Panel (d) represents the extensive margin of communal violence based on observational event data we assembled.

A.6 Financing Return

In Table A-1 we study a response to the question “How did you finance your trip back to Afghanistan?” Specifically, we assess the outcome “support from UNHCR.” In Table A-2, we conduct a placebo test, and study other responses to the financing question, like savings, gifts/loans, and “support from IOM.”

Table A-1: Encashment Beneficiaries Financed Return with UNHCR Aid

	Financed Return With UNHCR Aid (=1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Encashment Beneficiary	0.153*** (0.030)	0.147*** (0.029)	0.142*** (0.028)	0.100** (0.047)	0.100** (0.046)	0.100** (0.046)
Observations	7345	7345	7345	7345	7345	7345
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS						
District FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum				Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return				Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability					Yes	Yes
Interview Order						Yes

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

Table A-2: Placebo Estimates of Return Financing

	Financed Return Through Other Means (=1)				
	(1) Savings	(2) Gifts or Loans	(3) Selling Property	(4) IOM Aid	(5) MoRR Aid
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.068 (0.067)	0.020 (0.044)	0.039 (0.033)	-0.102*** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	7345	7345	7345	7345	7345
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS					
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. IOM Aid is aid from the International Organization of Migration. MoRR Aid is aid from the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.

A.7 Reasons for Return

In Tables A-3 and A-4 we study responses to the question “Why did you return?” Open-ended responses were collected and categorized with pre-codes determined by the survey administration team. In Table A-3 we assess six outcomes related to negative experiences in the host country: (1) “Deported/forcibly removed from host country”; (2) “People of the host country were unwelcoming”; (3) “Could not get visa/permanent residency in host country”; (4) “Poor security conditions in the host country”; (5) “Poor economic conditions in the host country”; and (6) “Unemployment in host country.”

Table A-3: Encashment Beneficiaries’ Self-Reported Push Factors

	Reason for Return: Push Factors (=1)					
	(1) Deported/ Forcibly Removed	(2) Unwelcoming Conditions	(3) Lacked Visa/ Permanent Residency	(4) Poor Security	(5) Poor Economy	(6) Unemployment
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.043 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.015 (0.036)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.039)	0.003 (0.043)
Observations	7382	7382	7382	7382	7382	7382
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS						
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

In Table A-4 we assess six additional outcomes related to positive expectations about conditions in Afghanistan: (1) “Economic situation improved in Afghanistan”; (2) “Security situation improved in Afghanistan”; (3) “Family reunification”; (4) “People are being treated well in Afghanistan”; (5) “Education situation improved in Afghanistan”; and (6) “Patriotism.” Although the survey did not ask directly about cash assistance as an inducement to return, we believe that the role of cash assistance is most likely to be captured by perceptions that the “economic situation [had] improved in Afghanistan.” Strikingly, this is the only factor for which we find a distinguishable positive effect. Encashment beneficiaries are 1.6 percentage points more likely to self-report returning because of improving economic conditions in Afghanistan.

Table A-4: Encashment Beneficiaries’ Self-Reported Pull Factors

	Reason for Return: Pull Factors (=1)					
	(1) Improving Economy	(2) Improving Security	(3) Family Reunification	(4) Welcoming Conditions	(5) Improving Education	(6) Patriotism
Encashment Beneficiary	0.016* (0.009)	0.013 (0.022)	0.018 (0.041)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.020)
Observations	7382	7382	7382	7382	7382	7382
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS						
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights.

A.8 Covariate Balance

In Table A-5 we estimate a series of difference-in-means using data from the Survey of Afghan Returnees. Comparing encashment beneficiaries to other returnees reveals few demographic differences. Encashed returnee respondents repatriated in larger groups, and were more likely to be Pashtun, male, and reside in rural areas and in single family homes.

Table A-5: Covariate Balance Between Program and Non-Program Beneficiaries


	Returnee Non-Beneficiaries	Returnee Program Beneficiaries	Difference-in-Means (Non-Beneficiaries - Beneficiaries)
# of Returnees in Household	5.259 (4.233)	6.771 (5.220)	-1.522* **
Urban	0.261 (0.439)	0.180 (0.385)	0.087**
Female	0.473 (0.499)	0.372 (0.484)	0.100* **
Age: 18-25	0.257 (0.437)	0.259 (0.439)	0.001
Age: 26-35	0.351 (0.477)	0.365 (0.482)	-0.014
Age: 36-45	0.228 (0.419)	0.207 (0.406)	0.016
Age: 46-55	0.113 (0.317)	0.104 (0.306)	0.010
Age: 55+	0.051 (0.220)	0.064 (0.245)	-0.014
Ethnicity: Pashtun	0.520 (0.500)	0.889 (0.315)	-0.368* **
Ethnicity: Tajik	0.300 (0.458)	0.053 (0.225)	0.246* **
Ethnicity: Uzbek	0.031 (0.174)	0.008 (0.088)	0.022*
Ethnicity: Hazara	0.109 (0.312)	0.010 (0.099)	0.103* **
Ethnicity: Other	0.039 (0.194)	0.040 (0.197)	-0.003
Monthly Income	2.395 (1.854)	2.531 (1.854)	-0.131
Education	0.984 (1.330)	0.939 (1.328)	0.054
Dwelling: Single Family Home	0.745 (0.436)	0.802 (0.400)	-0.057*
Marital Status: Single	0.144 (0.351)	0.123 (0.329)	0.018
Marital Status: Married	0.834 (0.372)	0.854 (0.354)	-0.017
Marital Status: Widowed	0.022 (0.147)	0.023 (0.151)	-0.000
Marital Status: Separated	0.000 (0.017)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000
Tazkira Holder	0.849 (0.358)	0.867 (0.340)	-0.018
Social Capital Index (ICW)	0.021 (0.993)	0.033 (0.888)	-0.018
Resides Near Out-Group	0.584 (0.493)	0.607 (0.489)	-0.025

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Column 1 presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for survey respondents who were not beneficiaries of the cash program. Column 2 presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for survey respondents who were beneficiaries of the cash program. Column 3 presents difference-in-means from a series of t-tests.

A.9 Observed and Predicted Returns During the Cash Program

We predict returns by multiplying 2013 (pre-shock) cross-sectional district shares with the total source-specific returnee flow (Card, 2001; Boustan, Fishback and Kantor, 2010). All predicted returns are highly correlated with observed returns (Pearson's $\rho > 0.865$).

Figure A-6: Observed Versus Predicted Returns During the Cash Program



Note: Darker shades indicate more returns.

A.10 Summary Statistics: District-Level Analyses

Descriptive statistics for variables from our main, district-level analyses are provided here.

Table A-6: Summary Statistics: District Analyses

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Incidence of Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs (=1)	4378	0.553	0.497	0.000	1.000
Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs/100k Pop.	4378	5.918	13.786	0.000	356.947
Incidence of Communal Violence (=1)	4378	0.022	0.147	0.000	1.000
Communal Violence/100k Pop.	4378	0.040	0.358	0.000	12.533
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Share of 2013 Documented Returnees from Pakistan	4378	0.003	0.007	0.000	0.087
Grant Increase	4378	0.545	0.498	0.000	1.000
Share Returning to Origin Province	4378	0.480	0.454	0.000	1.000
Share Returning to Origin District	4378	0.402	0.426	0.000	1.000
Prefer Shura to State Court	3817	0.481	0.143	0.123	0.942
Prefer Elders to Gov't Officials	3817	0.403	0.154	0.000	0.906
Took Dispute to Shura	3795	0.206	0.154	0.000	1.000
Taliban Control	4378	0.538	0.499	0.000	1.000
CONTROL VARIABLES					
Share of Population-Speaking Pashtun	4378	0.456	0.426	0.000	1.000
Distance to International Border	4378	0.858	0.649	0.024	2.840
Travel Time to Provincial Center	4378	97.166	140.276	0.000	1477.900
Provincial Unemployment	4378	12.782	9.551	1.900	42.300
Provincial GINI Coefficient	4378	25.997	4.777	18.800	36.100
Nightlights/Population	4378	2.852	5.336	0.000	56.201
Ruggedness	4378	361.469	236.501	4.933	1030.219
Share of Land Under Cultivation	4378	20.070	23.927	0.000	100.000
Share of Cultivated Land Under Irrigation	4378	69.855	37.065	0.000	100.000
Hectares of Opium Cultivation (IHS)	4378	1.957	3.081	0.000	10.552
Hectares of Opium Eradication (IHS)	4378	0.686	1.684	0.000	7.936
Governance Spending/Population	4378	183190.471	632141.061	0.000	4687742.159
Infrastructure Spending/Population	4378	76669.563	301558.564	0.000	2140158.119
Health Spending/Population	4378	752798.881	3375408.841	0.000	39326316.661
Conflict Stabilization Spending/Population	4378	598783.819	4777412.345	0.000	52504168.908
Refugees Spending/Population	4378	3201.398	20403.410	0.000	301105.179

Note: Observations are district-months used in the main estimating sample. For reference, we find that on average, returnee households were roughly gender balanced. The average returnee household in 2016 was comprised of 49% women of any age, and this proportion does not distinguishably vary before versus after the encashment program (pre: 47.7%; post: 50.2%). We lack data to assess gender-by-age composition of households.

A.11 Summary Statistics: Survey Analyses

Descriptive statistics for variables from our survey analyses are provided here. Those interested in the gender composition of returnee households will note a small discrepancy between the reported share of encashment beneficiaries who are women in the survey (37.5%) and the reported share of encashment recipients who were women according to our UNHCR data (50.2%). The survey covers refugee returnees aged 18 or older, whereas our UNHCR data cover all returnees (including children), and we do not know the gender-age composition of each returnee household. Hence, the true share of encashment beneficiaries who are adult women is likely to be closer to the survey-based share than the raw UNHCR-based share reveals at face.

Table A-7: Summary Statistics: Survey Analyses

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Returnee-Stayee Relations Index (ICW)	7391	0.028	0.981	-4.523	1.624
Returnee-Stayee Relations Index (PCF)	7283	0.027	0.971	-4.970	1.219
Experienced Communal Violence (=1)	7364	0.123	0.329	0.000	1.000
Experienced Linguistic Discrimination (=1)	7353	0.281	0.449	0.000	1.000
Financed Return With UNHCR Aid (=1)	7345	0.080	0.272	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Deported/Forcibly Returned (=1)	7382	0.215	0.411	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Unwelcoming Host Community (=1)	7382	0.056	0.230	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Lacked Visa/Permanent Residency in Host (=1)	7382	0.079	0.270	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Poor Security Conditions in Host (=1)	7382	0.097	0.296	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Poor Economic Conditions in Host (=1)	7382	0.118	0.322	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Unemployment in Host (=1)	7382	0.219	0.413	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Improving Economy in Afghanistan (=1)	7382	0.010	0.100	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Improving Security in Afghanistan (=1)	7382	0.023	0.151	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Family Reunification (=1)	7382	0.121	0.326	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Welcoming Conditions in Afghanistan (=1)	7382	0.010	0.101	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Improving Education in Afghanistan (=1)	7382	0.006	0.077	0.000	1.000
Reason for Return: Patriotism (=1)	7382	0.029	0.167	0.000	1.000
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Encashment Beneficiary	7391	0.042	0.199	0.000	1.000
Social Capital Index (ICW)	7391	0.021	0.989	-5.387	1.264
Resides Near Out-Group	7295	0.585	0.493	0.000	1.000
CONTROL VARIABLES					
Host Country: Pakistan	7391	0.559	0.496	0.000	1.000
Host Country: Iran	7391	0.355	0.478	0.000	1.000
Host Country: Elsewhere	7391	0.086	0.280	0.000	1.000
Registered Return	7391	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
Urban	7391	0.258	0.437	0.000	1.000
Female	7391	0.469	0.499	0.000	1.000
Age	7391	2.350	1.130	1.000	5.000
Education	7391	0.982	1.330	0.000	5.000
Income	7391	2.401	1.854	0.000	9.000
Ethnicity: Pashtun	7391	0.536	0.499	0.000	1.000
Ethnicity: Tajik	7391	0.290	0.454	0.000	1.000
Ethnicity: Uzbek	7391	0.030	0.171	0.000	1.000
Ethnicity: Hazara	7391	0.105	0.307	0.000	1.000
Ethnicity: Other	7391	0.039	0.195	0.000	1.000
Tazkira-Holder	7391	0.850	0.357	0.000	1.000
Dwelling: Single Family House	7391	0.748	0.434	0.000	1.000
Dwelling: Shared House	7391	0.229	0.420	0.000	1.000
Dwelling: Single Family Apartment	7391	0.015	0.120	0.000	1.000
Dwelling: Shared Apartment	7391	0.007	0.085	0.000	1.000
Dwelling: Tent	7391	0.002	0.042	0.000	1.000
Relationship Status: Single	7391	0.143	0.350	0.000	1.000
Relationship Status: Married	7391	0.835	0.371	0.000	1.000
Relationship Status: Widow/Widower	7391	0.022	0.147	0.000	1.000
Relationship Status: Divorced/Separated	7391	0.000	0.016	0.000	1.000
Comfort During Interview	7391	1.278	0.484	1.000	4.000
Interview # Within Sampling Point	7391	2.987	1.411	1.000	5.000

Note: Observations are individual responses used in the main estimating sample. ICW denotes an index constructed by inverse covariance-weighting. PCF denotes an index constructed by principal component factor analysis.

A.12 Intensive Margin of Insurgent Violence

Our core estimates in Table 2 center on the extensive margin of insurgent violence and insurgent violence per 100,000 district residents. In Table A-8, we examine how program-induced returns affected the intensive margin of rebel violence. Because this is a count outcome, we use a Poisson estimator, which is both more suitable for counts and helps verify robustness of our results to alternative estimators. Consistent with our main results, we find that returnee exposure reduced insurgent attacks in levels.

Table A-8: Intensive Margin of Insurgent Violence

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs (Intensive Margin)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.037*** (0.013)	-0.036*** (0.011)
Observations	3971	3971	3971	3971	3971
Clusters	361	361	361	361	361
PARAMETERS					
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

Whereas our OLS models use demeaning to account for fixed effects, in Poisson models the fixed effects are eliminated by conditioning on the sum of the dependent variable over time (Correia, Guimarães and Zylkin, 2020). In the latter case, panels where the dependent variable is constant are not informative, and hence dropped. Given that many panels are singletons or separated by fixed effects, some loss of observations occurs. This problem is more severe for communal violence, which is relatively rare. To facilitate convergence, we therefore omit reconstruction controls here.

A.13 Extensive and Intensive Margins of Communal Violence

Our core estimates on social conflict in Table 3 center on an index of returnees' relations with their non-migrant neighbors. Given the difficulty of measuring communal disputes systematically, we believe this offers the most reasonable approach to understanding how the encashment program shaped social strife. As described in Section A.5, we also assembled observational data on social conflict, which we study in Tables A-9 and A-10.

Table A-9: Communal Violence Increased Under the Encashment Program

	Communal Violence									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.009*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

Table A-10: Intensive Margin of Communal Violence

	Communal Violence (Intensive Margin)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.104*** (0.021)	0.145*** (0.044)	0.170*** (0.056)	0.974* (0.564)	2.483*** (0.801)
Observations	759	552	552	552	552
Clusters	69	68	68	68	68
PARAMETERS					
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

In Table A-10, we examine how program-induced returns affected communal violence in levels. Because this is a count outcome, we use a Poisson estimator, which is both more suitable for counts and helps verify robustness of our results to alternative estimators. Consistent with our main results, we find that returnee exposure increased social conflict. Whereas our OLS models use demeaning to account for fixed effects, in Poisson models the fixed effects are eliminated by conditioning on the sum of the dependent variable over time (Correia, Guimarães and Zylkin, 2020). In the latter case, panels where the dependent variable is constant are not informative, and hence dropped. Given that many panels are singletons or separated by fixed effects, some loss of observations occurs. This problem is more severe for communal violence, which is relatively rare. To facilitate convergence, we therefore omit reconstruction controls.

A.14 Naive and 2SLS Estimates Communal Violence

In Table 4 we estimate naive and two-stage least squares regressions, taking observed district shares of returnees from Pakistan for each year-specific month. We repeat these specifications while studying communal violence in Table A-11. A one standard deviation increase in the district-month share of encashed returns increased the probability of communal violence by 6.5% (column 6) and communal violence per 100,000 residents by 0.037 attacks (column 10).

Table A-11: Naive and 2SLS Estimates of Communal Violence

	Share of Returnees from Pakistan		Communal Violence							
			Extensive Margin				Per 100K Pop.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	1 st Stage OLS	1 st Stage OLS								
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.417*** (0.062)	0.195*** (0.017)								
Share of Returnees from Pakistan			0.023*** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.010)	0.005 (0.003)	0.023** (0.010)	0.007** (0.004)	0.037*** (0.012)
Observations	19104	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Kleibergen-Paap F Statistic				89.832		123.440		89.832		125.604
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Lagged DV					Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 2013 returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Share of returnees from Pakistan is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in a given year-specific month. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.15 Alternative Source of Cross-Sectional Variation

Endogeneity in the demand-pull component of return migration is the main threat to inference in our empirical strategy (Boustan, 2010). That is, initial district characteristics may be correlated with 2013 returnee settlement patterns. If districts with higher shares of earlier returnees are systematically safer, wealthier, or otherwise more conducive to returnee integration, our estimates will be biased. We present evidence that districts with greater exposure to returnees from Pakistan were not on differential trajectories of violence prior to the encashment program (Figure 6). In addition, we include an array of pre-shock controls to account for relevant district characteristics. Still, it remains possible that unobserved factors affect historical returnee settlement choices and violence.

As an alternative, we define cross-sectional exposure to refugee return using the geographic (straight-line) proximity between each Afghan district centroid and a UNHCR Encashment Centre (EC). In 2016, all registered returnees from Pakistan passed through one of three ECs in Kabul, Jalalabad, or Kandahar (Figure A-2), where they were interviewed and provided cash assistance. To reduce travel costs, most returnees resided closer to the facilities where they received their repatriation cash (Haroon et al., 2019). Distance is the chief influence on migrants' destination choice *ceteris paribus*. Unlike road distance, straight-line distance is unrelated to contemporary conditions in sending or receiving communities (Boustan, Fishback and Kantor, 2010).

In Table A-12 we re-estimate our core specifications from Table 2, replacing our cross-sectional measure of 2013 returnee shares with a cross-sectional measure of EC proximity. A natural concern is that UNHCR strategically places ECs in central locales. To address this, we control for travel time to the provincial center in columns 3-4 and 7-8 of Table A-12. Estimates are less precise for the extensive margin of insurgent violence, but still generally corroborate our main results.

Table A-12: Cross-Sectional Variation from Encashment Center Proximity

Panel A: Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs								
	Extensive Margin				Per 100k Pop.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Proximity to EC x Grant Increase	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.043 (0.029)	-1.752*** (0.564)	-1.768*** (0.511)	-1.885*** (0.715)	-1.307*** (0.477)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Panel B: Communal Violence								
	Extensive Margin				Per 100k Pop.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Proximity to EC x Grant Increase	0.041** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.050*** (0.017)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.051*** (0.016)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS								
Proximity to EC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Lagged DV				Yes				Yes

Note: * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Proximity to EC is each district's standardized, straight-line proximity to a UNHCR Encashment Centre for Afghan returnees from Pakistan. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.16 Accounting for Spontaneous, Undocumented Returns

Our main analyses define exposure to documented returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan using 2013 shares. During the encashment program, all and only documented returnees from Pakistan received the UNHCR cash grant, so by capturing documented Pakistan returns, our reduced-form measure implicitly captures exposure to encashed returns. However, it is natural to wonder how spontaneous returnees, who did not receive cash, impacted violence.

Our UNHCR data represent the universe of documented returns, but no similar data exists to measure spontaneous returns. We reconstruct the nationwide (but not district-specific) flow of spontaneous returns (Figure 2) using IOM reports. To test for any impact of spontaneous returns in a regression setting, we take supplemental data from the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which provides a retrospective estimate of undocumented returns at the district-level for the period from 2012 to 2015. This source provides the estimated number of undocumented returnees from Pakistan and Iran to a district over the period from 2012-2015. We calculate the district share of total undocumented returnees as $\frac{\text{District Undocumented Returnees}}{\text{Total Undocumented Returnees}}$, standardize this share, and interact the measure with an indicator for the grant period. This yields an equivalent reduced-form to our focal measure. We believe this approach is the best possible measurement strategy, but we hesitate to draw strong inferences because the data on spontaneous returnees pools returns from Pakistan and Iran, covers a different base period (2012-2015 rather than 2013), and is based on retrospective estimates. As revealed in Table A-13, our core estimates are robust, while we find spontaneous returns have null or weakly opposite effects.

Table A-13: Accounting for Spontaneous, Undocumented Returns

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs		Communal Violence	
	(1) Extensive Margin	(2) Per 100k Pop.	(3) Extensive Margin	(4) Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.123** (0.053)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)
2012-2015 Undocumented Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.009 (0.010)	0.094 (0.138)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)
Observations	4367	4367	4367	4367
Clusters	397	397	397	397
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Undocumented returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of undocumented, refugee returnees from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan in 2012-2015. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights. The estimation sample here has one fewer district because the IOM DTM excludes Hisa-I-Awal Panjsher district in Panjsher Province.

We conduct an analogous test using our survey data. In particular, we define an indicator for returnees from Pakistan who repatriated during the encashment program but were not registered, and hence were ineligible for cash assistance. Results in Table A-14 suggest that the observed negative effect of returnees on communal relations is specific to encashed (i.e., documented/assisted) returnees who repatriated under the program we study. Coefficients on the term for undocumented returnees from Pakistan during the program are smaller in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable.

Table A-14: Undocumented Returnees' Community Relations

	Returnee-Stayee Relations Index									
	ICW					PCF				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.129** (0.057)	-0.140** (0.054)	-0.244* (0.127)	-0.237* (0.127)	-0.237* (0.127)	-0.178** (0.074)	-0.188*** (0.070)	-0.217* (0.113)	-0.209* (0.114)	-0.208* (0.114)
Undocumented Pakistan Returnee During Encashment Program	0.054 (0.048)	0.063 (0.049)	-0.053 (0.077)	-0.046 (0.077)	-0.047 (0.076)	0.009 (0.045)	0.028 (0.044)	-0.100 (0.072)	-0.093 (0.072)	-0.095 (0.072)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability				Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Interview Order					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW denotes an index constructed by inverse covariance-weighting. PCF denotes an index constructed by principal component factor analysis.

A.17 Robustness to Additional Controls for Historical Violence

In columns 1-10 of Table A-15, we introduce additional controls for historical violence. Specifically, we sum SIGACTs by district for 2013, per capitate these measures, and interact them with year-specific month fixed effects. Columns 1 and 6 represent our baseline estimates for reference. Columns 2 and 7 control for the total number of SIGACTs, columns 3 and 8 add counterinsurgent SIGACTs, columns 4 and 9 add insurgent SIGACTs, and columns 5 and 10 add criminal SIGACTs. Our main results are robust.

Table A-15: District Analyses Robust to Historical Violence Controls

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.112** (0.052)	-0.132*** (0.048)	-0.117** (0.050)	-0.182*** (0.046)	-0.132*** (0.047)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R ²	0.518	0.519	0.519	0.518	0.518	0.583	0.586	0.586	0.587	0.585
	Communal Violence									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Adjusted R ²	0.495	0.496	0.494	0.497	0.495	0.047	0.045	0.046	0.047	0.045
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total SIGACTs x Month		Yes					Yes			
Counterinsurgent SIGACTs x Month			Yes					Yes		
Insurgent SIGACTs x Month				Yes					Yes	
Criminal SIGACTs x Month					Yes					Yes

Note: * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

In Table A-16, we take a complementary approach and introduce additional controls for historical violence in our survey-based regressions. Specifically, we sum SIGACTs by district for 2013, per capitize these measures, and interact them with survey wave fixed effects. Columns 1 and 6 represent our baseline estimates. Columns 2 and 7 control for the total number of SIGACTs, columns 3 and 8 add counterinsurgent SIGACTs, columns 4 and 9 add insurgent SIGACTs, and columns 5 and 10 add criminal SIGACTs. Our main results are robust.

Table A-16: Survey Analyses Robust to Historical Violence Controls

	Returnee–Stayee Relations Index									
	ICW					PCF				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.237* (0.126)	-0.238* (0.125)	-0.235* (0.125)	-0.231* (0.125)	-0.199* (0.113)	-0.203* (0.114)	-0.207* (0.115)	-0.202* (0.114)	-0.200* (0.114)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total SIGACTs x Wave		Yes					Yes			
Counterinsurgent SIGACTs x Wave			Yes					Yes		
Insurgent SIGACTs x Wave				Yes					Yes	
Criminal SIGACTs x Wave					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW denotes an index constructed by inverse covariance-weighting. PCF denotes an index constructed by principal component factor analysis.

A.18 Robustness to Other Additional Parameters

In columns 2-5 and 7-10 of Table A-17, we introduce additional parameters. Columns 1 and 6 reflect our baseline estimates for comparison. Columns 2 and 7 control for each district's share of pre-program IDPs, columns 3 and 8 control for ethnic fractionalization, columns 4 and 9 control for ethnic polarization, and columns 5 and 10 account for contested territorial control. Controls are pre-program covariates interacted with year-specific month fixed effects.

Table A-17: District Analyses Robust to Other Additional Parameters

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.112** (0.052)	-0.146*** (0.052)	-0.111** (0.056)	-0.109* (0.056)	-0.106** (0.053)
Observations	4378	4367	4378	4378	4378	4378	4367	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	397	398	398	398	398	397	398	398	398
Adjusted R ²	0.518	0.517	0.519	0.519	0.518	0.583	0.583	0.583	0.583	0.583
	Communal Violence									
	Extensive Margin					Per 100k Pop.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.013*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Observations	4378	4367	4378	4378	4378	4378	4367	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	397	398	398	398	398	397	398	398	398
Adjusted R ²	0.495	0.524	0.501	0.500	0.495	0.047	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.047
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IDPs x Month		Yes					Yes			
Ethnic Fractionalization x Month			Yes					Yes		
Ethnic Polarization x Month				Yes					Yes	
Contested Territorial Control x Month					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

We conduct an analogous test using our survey data. In particular, we assess robustness to additional controls pertaining to the size of returnee households, land ownership, the ethno-demographic composition of returnees' neighborhoods, and respondents' self-reported reasons for return. To measure returnee household size we study responses to the question "how many people in this household have returned to Afghanistan?". To measure land ownership we study responses to the question "does your household currently own jeribs of land?" To measure the ethno-demographic composition of returnees' neighborhoods we construct an inverse covariance-weighted index composed of responses to two questions. First, we define an indicator for respondents who answered "to be around people of the same ethnicity," "to be around people who speak the same language," or "staying/living with family" when asked "why did you decide to move to the place you are living now?" Second, we define an indicator for respondents who answered that "immediate family," "extended family," "returnees from [their] ethnic group," or "returnees from other ethnic groups" when asked whether "the following types of people live in [their] neighborhood." We combine these items using an index that captures neighborhood social capital provided by networks of kin and other returnees. To measure reason for return we study responses to the question "why did you return?" The core finding—that returnees report worse relations with their non-migrant neighbors—is confirmed in each case.

Table A-18: Survey Analyses Robust to Other Additional Parameters

	Returnee-Stayee Relations Index									
	ICW					PCF				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.231* (0.126)	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.228* (0.125)	-0.244* (0.127)	-0.199* (0.113)	-0.197* (0.113)	-0.199* (0.113)	-0.195* (0.112)	-0.212* (0.115)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of Returnees in Household		Yes					Yes			
Landowner			Yes					Yes		
Social Capital				Yes					Yes	
Reason for Return					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW denotes an index constructed by inverse covariance-weighting. PCF denotes an index constructed by principal component factor analysis.

A.19 Robustness to Excluding Population Weights

Because violence varies with population size, our errors are likely to be heteroskedastic, even after we cluster by district. We incorporate population weights to address gravitation toward urban centers—what (Petrin, 2002) calls “urban bias”—in returnee flows. Our decision to incorporate population weights also follows Solon, Haider and Wooldridge (2015), who describe how weighting corrects for heteroskedasticity, thereby improving precision. In line with this logic, Table A-19 shows weighting improves precision of our core estimates. Columns 1 and 7 reproduce our baselines specifications from columns 5 and 10 of Table 2 for reference. Columns 2-6 and 8-12 estimate unweighted results.

Table A-19: Robustness to Excluding Population Weights

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs											
	Extensive Margin						Per 100k Pop.					
	(1) Baseline	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Baseline	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.112** (0.052)	-0.054 (0.199)	-0.095 (0.277)	-0.226 (0.287)	-0.212 (0.252)	-0.187 (0.199)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS												
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes					Yes	Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.20 Substitution in Tactics and Lethality

To test the reservation wage mechanism, we study tactical diversity and insurgent lethality in Tables 5 and 6. Here, we estimate complementary models. In columns 1 and 2 we study the share of all insurgent-initiated attacks that are explosive, expressed as $\frac{\text{Explosions}_{d,t}}{\text{Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs}_{d,t}}$. This measure is undefined where no insurgent violence occurs. Hence, in column 1 we exclude observations without insurgent-initiated attacks, and in column 2 we fill these observations with zeroes. Column 2 also adds an indicator that takes the value one when a district experiences positive levels of conflict and zero otherwise. In columns 3 and 4 we study the share of all insurgent-initiated caused counterinsurgent casualties from explosive violence, expressed as $\frac{\text{Casualties from Explosives}_{d,t}}{\text{Casualties}_{d,t}}$. This measure is undefined where no casualties occurs. Hence, in column 3 we exclude observations without counterinsurgent casualties, and in column 4 we fill these observations with zeroes. Column 4 also adds an indicator that takes the value one when a district experiences positive levels of casualties and zero otherwise.

Table A-20: Substitution in Tactics and Lethality

	Tactical Substitution		Substitution in Lethality	
	(1) Explosive Share (Missing)	(2) Explosive Share (Filled)	(3) Casualty Share (Missing)	(4) Casualty Share (Filled)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.017*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.002)
Observations	1796	4378	939	4378
Clusters	250	398	159	398
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome (=1)		Yes		Yes

Note: * p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. Outcome (=1) is an indicator for whether any violence of the respective type occurred. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.21 Social Capital Mitigates Communal Violence

In Table 8 we study an index of social capital constructed using inverse covariance-weighting. This measure is described in greater detail in Table A-18. The core results are robust if we instead construct a social capital index using principal component factor analysis.

Table A-21: Communal Conflict and an Alternative Social Capital Index

	Returnee–Stayee Relations Index											
	ICW						PCF					
	(1) Baseline	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) Baseline	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.148*** (0.055)	-0.157*** (0.053)	-0.228* (0.127)	-0.220* (0.128)	-0.219* (0.129)	-0.199* (0.113)	-0.194** (0.074)	-0.203*** (0.070)	-0.197* (0.112)	-0.190* (0.113)	-0.189 (0.114)
Encashment Beneficiary x Social Capital (PCF)		0.195*** (0.054)	0.201*** (0.051)	0.192*** (0.056)	0.192*** (0.055)	0.191*** (0.055)		0.181** (0.075)	0.187** (0.071)	0.175** (0.076)	0.175** (0.075)	0.175** (0.075)
Social Capital (PCF)		0.058*** (0.020)	0.051*** (0.019)	0.053*** (0.019)	0.052*** (0.018)	0.052*** (0.019)		0.064*** (0.019)	0.055*** (0.018)	0.055*** (0.018)	0.054*** (0.018)	0.054*** (0.018)
Observations	7391	7231	7231	7231	7231	7231	7283	7134	7134	7134	7134	7134
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS												
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes					Yes	Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Encashment beneficiary is an indicator for documented refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Country of asylum and registration status by month of return fixed effects absorb constituent terms of the interaction that comprises our indicator for likely program recipients. Social capital is a principal component factors index of social connections to familial kin and other returnees. Urbanicity is an indicator for urban (vs. rural) respondents. Gender is an indicator for male (vs. female) respondents. Tazkira is an indicator for respondents with a national identity card. Age, education, and dwelling have five categories. Income has 10 categories. Marital status has four categories. Social desirability is a measure of respondent comfort with four categories. Interview order captures the order of interviews within sampling points. Estimates are scaled using sampling weights. ICW indicates an index constructed using inverse covariance-weighting. PCF indicates an index constructed using principal component factor analysis.

We take a comparable approach to understand the role of social capital in mitigating communal violence using our supplemental event data on local feuds. To proxy for social capital in these specifications, we calculate the 2013 share of returnees from Pakistan to their origin province and district. In columns 3-4 of Table A-22, we interact the reduced-form (2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase) with the share of returnees to a district in their origin province. In columns 5-6 of Table A-22, we interact the reduced-form (2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase) with the share of returnees to their origin district.

Table A-22: Social Capital Mitigates Observed Communal Conflict

	Communal Violence					
	Baseline		Share Returning to Origin Province		Share Returning to Origin District	
	(1) Extensive Margin	(2) Per 100k Pop.	(3) Extensive Margin	(4) Per 100k Pop.	(5) Extensive Margin	(6) Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase x Social Capital			-0.031** (0.013)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.033* (0.019)
Grant Increase x Social Capital			-0.014 (0.016)	0.006 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.011 (0.027)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS						
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Social capital is each district's 2013 share of repatriates returning to their origin province (columns 3-4) or district (columns 5-6). Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.22 Communal Violence, Social Capital, and Historical Violence

A natural concern is that districts high in social capital are less violent in the first place. To address this concern we re-estimate the core social capital specifications from Tables 8 and A-22) while controlling for levels of violence in a district in 2013 (i.e., total number of SIGACTs). The core results are robust.

Table A-23: Community Relations, Social Capital, and Historical Violence

	Returnee–Stayee Relations Index									
	ICW					PCF				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encashment Beneficiary	-0.235* (0.126)	-0.239* (0.126)	-0.240* (0.126)	-0.237* (0.126)	-0.233* (0.125)	-0.201* (0.112)	-0.204* (0.113)	-0.209* (0.114)	-0.203* (0.113)	-0.202* (0.113)
Encashment Beneficiary x Social Capital	0.191*** (0.054)	0.188*** (0.056)	0.187*** (0.055)	0.189*** (0.055)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.176** (0.075)	0.171** (0.076)	0.168** (0.075)	0.173** (0.076)	0.176** (0.075)
Social Capital	0.055*** (0.019)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.055*** (0.019)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.056*** (0.018)
Observations	7391	7391	7391	7391	7391	7283	7283	7283	7283	7283
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status x Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total SIGACTs x Wave		Yes					Yes			
Counterinsurgent SIGACTs x Wave			Yes					Yes		
Insurgent SIGACTs x Wave				Yes					Yes	
Criminal SIGACTs x Wave					Yes					Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Social capital is each district's 2013 share of repatriates returning to their origin province (columns 3-4) or district (columns 5-6). Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

In Table A-24 we study our supplemental event data on communal violence. In panel A we proxy for social capital using the share of returnees repatriating to their origin province. In panel B we proxy for social capital using the share of returnees repatriating to their origin district. Columns 1-2 report our baseline estimates for reference. Columns 3-4 control for total SIGACTs, columns 5-6 control for counterinsurgent SIGACTs, columns 7-8 control for insurgent SIGACTs, and columns 9-10 control for criminal SIGACTs.

Table A-24: Social Conflict, Social Capital, and Historical Violence

Communal Violence										
Panel A:	Share Returning to Origin Province									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.023*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.006)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase x Social Capital	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.034*** (0.013)	-0.025* (0.015)	-0.031** (0.013)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.035*** (0.012)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.023 (0.015)
Grant Increase x Social Capital	-0.014 (0.016)	0.006 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.006 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.009 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.016)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.007 (0.025)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Panel B:	Share Returning to Origin District									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.	Extensive Margin	Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase x Social Capital	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.033* (0.019)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.035* (0.019)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.035* (0.019)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.034* (0.019)
Grant Increase x Social Capital	-0.002 (0.018)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.016 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.010 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.018)	0.012 (0.027)
Observations	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total SIGACTs x Month			Yes	Yes						
Counterinsurgent SIGACTs x Month					Yes	Yes				
Insurgent SIGACTs x Month							Yes	Yes		
Criminal SIGACTs x Month									Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Social capital is each district's 2013 share of repatriates returning to their origin province (panel A) or district (panel B). Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.23 Quantifying Local Institutional Quality in Afghanistan

In Table A-26 we study how strong, local institutions mitigate communal violence in the wake of repatriation. We use four cross-sectional measures of informal institutional strength drawn from a variety of sources. We describe these sources here.

First, we draw on three measures from the Afghan Quarterly Nationwide Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey. ANQAR is a NATO-funded, representative survey fielded throughout Afghanistan by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). ACSOR hires and trains local enumerators to conduct field research. Districts are selected via a probability proportional to size systematic sampling approach, and within districts, villages and settlements are randomly selected. A random walk method is used to identify target households, and a Kish grid is used to randomize the respondent within selected households. Before fielding, ACSOR engages with local elders to secure permission for enumerators to enter sample villages. This culturally-sensitive approach ensures survey enumerators have access to contested and insurgent-controlled areas. We use data from all 2013 waves, and collapse the three questions described in Table A-25 to the district-level for use in Table A-26.

Second, we draw on one measure from ACSOR’s field reports, which record whether the Taliban contested or controlled influence in a district in 2013. This enumerability-based measure of insurgent control avoids challenges associated with measuring territorial control in ways explicitly endogenous to local violence.

Table A-25: Measuring Local Institutional Quality in Afghanistan

Variable Name	Question	Response	Source
Prefer Shura to State Court	If you had a legal dispute, would you take it to an Afghanistan state court or a local Shura/Jirga?	To a Shura/Jirga	ANQAR
Prefer Elders to Gov’t Officials	If you had a problem, would you go to your local tribal leaders or the official government representatives?	Local tribal leaders	ANQAR
Took Dispute to Shura	Have you taken a dispute to an Afghanistan state court or a local Shura/Jirga in the past year?	Yes, local Shura/Jirga	ANQAR
Taliban Control	Coded based on ACSOR field reports, which describe district enumerability for survey administrators	Average level of Taliban territorial control in 2013	ACSOR

Note: Took dispute to shura is only coded using the subset of respondents who reported having a dispute in the past year.

A.24 Strong, Local Institutions Mitigate Communal Violence

We calculate the four measures described in Table A-25, and use these measures to proxy for strong, local institutions. In columns 3-10 of Table A-26, we interact the reduced-form (2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase) with these measures in turn. Columns 1-2 report our baseline estimates for reference.

Table A-26: Strong, Local Institutions Dampen Return-Induced Social Conflict

	Communal Violence									
	Baseline		Prefer Shura to State Court		Prefer Elders to Gov't Officials		Took Dispute to Shura		Taliban Control	
	(1) Extensive Margin	(2) Per 100k Pop.	(3) Extensive Margin	(4) Per 100k Pop.	(5) Extensive Margin	(6) Per 100k Pop.	(7) Extensive Margin	(8) Per 100k Pop.	(9) Extensive Margin	(10) Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.015* (0.008)	0.054*** (0.018)	0.036* (0.022)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.021* (0.012)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase x Strong, Local Institutions			-0.096*** (0.029)	-0.055 (0.036)	-0.151** (0.066)	-0.107 (0.078)	-0.183* (0.100)	-0.156 (0.120)	-0.054* (0.028)	-0.045 (0.029)
Grant Increase x Strong, Local Institutions			-0.042 (0.046)	-0.113 (0.109)	0.003 (0.049)	-0.005 (0.078)	0.023 (0.047)	-0.044 (0.068)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.023)
Observations	4378	4378	3817	3817	3817	3817	3795	3795	4378	4378
Clusters	398	398	347	347	347	347	345	345	398	398
Data Source	—	—	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ACSOR	ACSOR
PARAMETERS										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Strong, local institutions are: 2013 average reliance on shuras (columns 3-4) or elders (columns 5-6); usage of shuras (columns 7-8); or Taliban governance (columns 9-10). Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

A.25 Communal Violence, Institutions, and Historical Violence

A natural concern is that districts with stronger local institutions are less violent in the first place. To address this concern we re-estimate the local institutions (Table A-26) specifications while controlling for levels of violence in a district in 2013 (i.e., total number of SIGACTs). In results omitted for space but available upon request we also verify robustness to controlling for historical levels of counterinsurgent, insurgent, and criminal SIGACTs. The core results are robust in every case.

Table A-27: Communal Violence, Local Institutions, and Historical Violence

	Communal Violence							
	Prefer Shura to State Court		Prefer Elders to Gov't Officials		Took Dispute to Shura		Taliban Control	
	(1) Extensive Margin	(2) Per 100k Pop.	(3) Extensive Margin	(4) Per 100k Pop.	(5) Extensive Margin	(6) Per 100k Pop.	(7) Extensive Margin	(8) Per 100k Pop.
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase	0.032*** (0.006)	0.016* (0.008)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.039* (0.023)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.021* (0.012)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
2013 Returnee Share x Grant Increase x Strong, Local Institutions	-0.102*** (0.030)	-0.062* (0.037)	-0.162** (0.069)	-0.120 (0.082)	-0.185* (0.100)	-0.159 (0.121)	-0.054* (0.028)	-0.045 (0.029)
Grant Increase x Strong, Local Institutions	-0.049 (0.046)	-0.121 (0.110)	0.008 (0.049)	0.000 (0.077)	0.024 (0.047)	-0.043 (0.068)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.023)
Observations	3817	3817	3817	3817	3795	3795	4378	4378
Clusters	347	347	347	347	345	345	398	398
Data Source	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ANQAR	ACSOR	ACSOR
PARAMETERS								
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
UNHCR Area x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pashtun Share x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reconstruction Controls x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total SIGACTs x Month	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Returnee share is each district's standardized share of the sum of documented, refugee returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2013. Grant increase is an indicator for July through December 2016, when the UNHCR offered an increased repatriation grant. Strong, local institutions are: 2013 average reliance on shuras (column 2) or elders (column 3); usage of shuras (column 4); or Taliban governance (column 5). Development controls are: distance to the border; travel time to the provincial center; ruggedness; provincial unemployment; provincial GINI coefficient; and population-normalized nightlights. Agricultural controls are: the share of land under cultivation; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; and hectares of opium cultivation and eradication (inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed). Reconstruction controls are: per capita spending on governance, infrastructure, health, conflict stabilization, and refugees projects. All controls are pre-shock measures interacted with year-specific month fixed effects. Estimates are scaled using population weights.

B Data Appendix

B.1 Conflict

Our data on conflict come from official, government channels. These data are unclassified, but subject to access restrictions meaning they cannot be publicly shared. None of the data contain any potentially identifying information. The authors established access through a data agreement with the organization that maintains the data, NATO’s Communications and Information Agency. Interested researchers can contact Blair (chris.blair@princeton.edu) or Wright (austinlw@uchicago.edu) for more information about the authorization process.

B.1.1 Insurgent Violence

Military combat records come from the **International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE)**, an unclassified but restricted-access platform maintained by the US Defense Department. Events described in INDURE are sourced from the US military’s classified Combined Information Data Network Exchange. The INDURE files cover 2015-2017, and correspond with the Significant Activities (SIGACTs) database publicly available for earlier years in Afghanistan. These data were jointly collected by Afghanistan’s military and police forces and multinational forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). These records include information on combat activity as described in the manuscript. Additional information about the SIGACTs data is provided in [Berman, Shapiro and Felter \(2011\)](#); [andrew C. and Wright \(2017\)](#); [Condra et al. \(2018\)](#); [Fetzer et al. \(2021\)](#). Although these data do not include any identifying information about individuals, the data has not been formally released for public use.

B.2 Communal Violence

We take multiple strategies to measure social conflict in Afghanistan. Our data come from a survey of returnees and a government-sponsored conflict event tracker.

B.2.1 Survey of Returnees

Our main analyses study returnees’ communal relations using individual-level data from a survey of Afghan refugee returnees. This data come from the Asia Foundation’s **Survey of the Afghan R** fielded in 2018–2019. This survey also offers data we use in a variety of supplemental tests (e.g., Tables [A-1–A-4](#)). More details about survey administration are discussed in Section [4.2](#). The data are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/36lW3yh>. See [Breslawski \(2021\)](#) for another source using Asia Foundation survey data from Afghanistan.

B.2.2 Event Data

We compliment our survey-based data with supplemental records of conflict events. Specifically, to measure social conflict we undertake an original coding process using data from

a US Government and NATO-sponsored conflict tracker, which collates information from the Afghan National Police Command Center (NPCC), risk-reporting agencies contracted by the US State Department and Western embassies in Kabul, and open-source media. The data were secured through a legal agreement between the authors and NATO’s Communications and Information Agency. Following [Sexton \(2016\)](#), we use a supervised text analysis method based on a keyword-search algorithm available in Stata through the regular expressions command `regexm`. The tracker we use provides a categorical descriptor and an event narrative with 1-3 sentences describing the event. Using categorical descriptors, we filter out events pertaining to insurgent or counterinsurgent operations. To identify instances of social conflict, we code these filtered events using standard keywords in the event narratives, like LN (“local nationals”). An example code snippet is included below to illustrate:

```
keep if category=="Other"
```

```
gen communalviolence=(regexm(narrative, "conflict") & regexm(narrative, "tribes")
| regexm(narrative, "conflict") & regexm(narrative, "personal enmity") |
regexm(narrative, "conflict") & regexm(narrative, "nomad") | regexm(narrative,
"conflict") & regexm(narrative, "land issues") | regexm(narrative, "conflict")
& regexm(narrative, "grazing") | regexm(narrative, "conflict") & regexm(
narrative, "water") | regexm(narrative, "LN") & regexm(narrative, "dispute") |
regexm(narrative, "LN") & regexm(narrative, "clash") | regexm(narrative,
"conflict") & regexm(narrative, "irresponsible armed"))
```

B.3 Migration

Our data on refugee return come from UNHCR and IOM.

B.3.1 Documented Refugee Returns

We use two sources for data on documented refugee returns. In Figures 1 and A-1, we study the time-series of refugee stocks and returns for select countries. These records cover several decades, but entail limitations (see [Fearon and Andrew C., 2020](#)). The data come from the UNHCR PopStats database available here: <https://bit.ly/3hNBCzx>. See [Moore and Shellman \(2007\)](#) and [Zakirova and Buzurukov \(2021\)](#) for more discussion and applications of the data.

Our granular measures of refugee return used in the main analyses come from the UNHCR-Afghanistan office, and describe the complete record of documented returns to Afghanistan for the period from 2013-2014 and 2016-2017. More details about these records are provided in the manuscript. The data are available through the Humanitarian Data Exchange at: <https://bit.ly/3yyLNPI>. We do not observe monthly inflows of returnees to Afghanistan for 2015, but reconstruct these using information contained in UNHCR field reports and the UNHCR’s Population Movement Bulletin.

B.3.2 Spontaneous Refugee Returns

To reconstruct monthly inflows of spontaneous returnees reflected in Figure 2, we draw on Flow Monitoring Reports filed by IOM officials of the Cross Border Return and Reintegration, Protection, Humanitarian Assistance, and Reintegration and Development (RADA) program. These data contain no information on the destination district of returnees and are collapsed into a time series of return.

B.3.3 Internally Displaced People

In Table A-17 we exploit data on internally displaced people (IDPs). To track IDPs, we use data from the IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which uses representative field surveys to provide retrospective estimates of displacement at the district level. We specifically draw on the product known as `Afghanistan - Baseline Assessment District Round 11`. These data are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/3xmwGIx>.

B.4 Administrative Boundaries and Geodata

Data on administrative boundaries (district and province) were retrieved from Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) research group and are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/39oJrre>. These administrative boundaries are used for synchronizing combat event data and other geodata.

B.4.1 Population

We rely on data provided by WorldPop, a project housed at the University of Southampton, to measure population. We specifically use the product known as `Unconstrained individual countries 2000-2020 (100 m)`, which provides global population estimates at a resolution of 100 square meter grid cells. Following Stevens et al. (2015), WorldPop uses an unconstrained, top-down, dasymetric modeling approach incorporating geospatial census and ancillary data in a flexible, random forest estimation. Using an annual time-series raster, we calculate population per district in 2013.

B.4.2 Ethnicity

We use spatial data from the on the location of population settlements to measure the share of Pashto speakers (Pashtun) in a given district. The location of village settlements was compiled by the Afghanistan Information Management Service, Central Statistics Office, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Yale University. Information on each settlement’s share of Pashto speakers was collected during the USAID-funded Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project. Our measures of ethnic fractionalization and polarization are also drawn from a USAID data repository on MISTI. For details on MISTI, see Egel and Glick (2016).

B.4.3 Terrain

We rely on data provided by the US Geological Survey’s Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) Center to calculate terrain ruggedness. Raster data from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) provide a global record of elevation. We use the product known as **SRTM 1 Arc-Second Global**, which captures void-filled data at a resolution of 1 arc-second. We calculate ruggedness as the standard deviation of elevation as in [Nunn and Puga \(2012\)](#).

B.4.4 Nightlights

We calculate variation in nighttime lights using the VIIRS: Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite. This data is compiled by the Earth Observation Group at the Colorado School of Mines using the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite. Following [Li et al. \(2020\)](#), we use the product known as **VIIRS Cloud Mask (vcm)**, which captures the detected radiance of city lights around the spectrum of 505–890 nanometers at a spatial resolution of 15 arc-seconds across the latitudinal zone of 65°S–75°N. This measure excludes observations affected by stray light, and corrects effects caused by biogeophysical processes (e.g. snow) using the bidirectional reflectance distribution function. Using an annual time-series raster, we calculate nightlights per district in 2013.

B.5 Development Aid

We incorporate information from the **Development Assistance Database (DAD)**, maintained by Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) and AidData. The data cover all external assistance projects in Afghanistan’s DAD, tracking more than \$16 billion in aid commitments for 1,561 projects across 7,168 locations between 2001 and 2014. We sum aid by category and district in 2013.

B.6 Economic Performance

We measure labor market and income-related covariates using data from the **Afghan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS)**. ALCS, previously known as the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), is a representative survey fielded by the Central Statistical Organization of Afghanistan, and used to assess development outcomes. We study provincial unemployment and the provincial GINI coefficient using the 2013–2014 ALCS wave, which covered 20,786 households and 157,262 people. These data are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/2V88yLp>, and described in greater detail by [Child \(2019\)](#).

B.7 Travel Time and Land Quality

We measure travel time to the provincial center and agricultural land quality using data from the World Bank’s Afghanistan Spatial Database, and specifically, the **District Dashboard**. This source compiles information from Afghan censuses, reports of the Central Statistical

Organization of Afghanistan, and proprietary World Bank sources. These data are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/2Van3yi>.

B.8 Opium Cultivation and Eradication

We measure cultivation and eradication of opium poppy using data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and specifically from the *Opium Survey 2013*. The UNODC-Afghanistan office estimates poppy production using ground-validated remote sensing techniques to track changes in vegetation during the spring harvest. After randomly spatially sampling potential agricultural zones within provinces, UNODC officials acquire pre- and post-harvest imagery, and examine them for changes in vegetative signatures consistent with the volatile wetness of opium plants after lancing. From this sampling technique, officers estimate the spatial risk of opium production, calculate gridded estimates, and then compile them as the annual amount of opium production in hectares for each district. To measure eradication, UNODC collects official reports of Governor-led opium poppy eradication, and deploys enumerators to verify eradication campaigns. These data are available at this link: <https://bit.ly/3qRBinq>, and described in greater detail by [Sonin and Wright \(2019\)](#).

B.9 Local Institutions

B.9.1 Shuras/Jirgas

We capture local reliance on informal institutions for dispute resolution using survey data from the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) platform. ANQAR is a NATO-funded effort, which tracks civilian attitudes on a host of pertinent outcomes. We offer a more detailed description of the enumeration process in Table A-25. Survey responses are collected on a quarterly basis by local contractors. Before administering each wave, elders are contacted to secure permission for enumerators to enter villages. When enumerators cannot access sampled villages, intercept interviews are used to collect information from residents traveling in neighboring areas. See [Condra and Wright \(2019\)](#) for a more comprehensive discussion of the data.

The individual-level ANQAR data are restricted-access only. The authors established access through a data agreement with the organization that maintains the data, NATO's Communications and Information Agency. Interested researchers can contact Blair (chris.blair@princeton.edu) or Wright (austinlw@uchicago.edu) for more information about the authorization process.

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